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PREFACE 
Ihi psrisnry ef this pap«3r i* to disuse Pctftidtent CImr*! Abdul 
{tester's diplMMtie and politieal MUtimis wi^ the Westem w^ld and l^e 
Seviet Onion* Hassan's ai^roach in his dealing »ith the gx«at p(»«8r$ has 
aadto hita one ef the nost «(»)t7evetslal peys^lities el CMiteaporary inter­
national politics* As an exai^leg we see ^at nyeh has been said in ths 
Aneriean pvess ab«ut his fexeisn pelieies* In mny easesf tuAiat has been 
said in tlM prass htm has been a66eB|>anied by besU aiseimeeptions el mhat 
have been tl« tamer and dkMfHir netives behind United Anb ReiHiblie 
least's stands* Playing tNi role of a neutral politieal leader* Ni seens 
to i»eSllate betmen tiMi posing pOMer bloos for seaie s^ of daiHc» deir* 
ions aietives of his (mr* Sons Awirioan press (such as, fi^ example* tiie 
and World Report) has bmnded hin as a "CeoKmist stooge" or a 
^fanatio Arab nationalist*** In additiafi, his i^ur^se of Cooraunist ams to 
stiengthen his amy proepted V^aimm newMMin to aoeuse hia of opening Mid­
dle Eastern doors to Connunist iaperialisa* These eharaeteri2ati<ms of 
Hasser's personality and polioy, it sesns, have resulted priaarily fros 
Msstem misunderstanding of Maeser's ttm intentimis* 
It is not intended in ̂ ^s thesis to criticize the ISnited States <Sov-
esfisent, €» any other iNisteiin gove^riBentf im its dealings with ̂  U*A.R. 
leader* Rather, this paper reflects Urn autilierU desire to straighten out 
Biseemceptiffins and to el^nata misunderstandings* It is hoped ^at a new, 
ecsisl^etive Nsstexn policy toward the Middle Bast will finally Mwirge* 
Su^ a policy would sten out of deep ui^rstandin^ of Middle Eastern poli­
ties and would realize ^at Arab nationalism has a coeamcm destiny with the 
i$astem world, and that, if President Nasser as the leader of this dynaaic 
i 
a 
m&mamt b«& In aliitsty ai^ »$sists»e« ttm 
ti# Cwmm%%t wx-iit h# hM% <^nt m nut &f « vol^tn^ary ^sit* tet 
lit mM iimM« t« fiiii muf tm€^matmi^ In te 
l!i#f« fftfOMi t@ d6«l m siiisfc «n ejit««Hitw 8««i# *44li ## ":iHri#t felae pwlmx^ 
ily ?ii8ti»zn mmm^ st»c^ «s t« .p^t«wi#e lii« 
iK^xn tm mti^. Immli 
p^if » til® wl.«*d«wl ®# tsbd 0f#»r to fliii«®« "ai# Miflt A^awa 
Ih# «#»at ©# MmMmmtim in sii^iiittWt «4th Its proc 
t» f®ii®wr« ptlley tfe»t ttfl#el^  Itoti i^l.l%l«« ®f mwl4§ 
fc«fi §lmn W€h. h«^ fm imt^w fetot# NitweniR ti«- Fow» 
« tM at l»mtp tawl wwrii# TImm it t© !&«• 
il«w ti»t t>i@ United &Utm$ » «ati®a» »lll pl«y a dfttSMSIc 
In imlimUm of ̂  Iww8» ta Hw Mliailt East. 
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CHAPUR I 
A (aASCE AT IHS PRE«RI¥0WJnC3HAmr iSH>T 
Xi9i td im^xsttnd niiy Sgnnpt* wai4»x leadtcship of CiMMl Abchil 
Ht«8«x» has ̂ *P9lspsd its oAi^ pmdtitm vis<««*iris tl» &r«st Peiisi^ em* 
timp&mrf iatoanaationtal £«l«ti«»i9» sjiielt 9m c^iraotsri^d by psrsistsat 
6^flists» » slai# el tiis histsty of me4»m igri^t ptim t& Hit «»y ecMs 
<i'»tat ef July 23» is semtldtisi ustssssiry* 
Hist^istts imm gsiMixsiiy sfytsd i^t tlM i^yn histsty sf Bgiypt bt* 
gan with llipeisim's invasien ei ̂  fimmttf in Althoisfh a mmktx el 
px«t«3cts tm ̂  invasisn «•<» 9iwn> soeh as eoriselidittos tiM pesiti«i tf 
the i^yptiaii fewnmnsatt it MIS hsiisvid lhat tiui xsal pagpmm hehini 
Fttnsh sj^ditiim was Aip#ls«a*s 9mM plan te tsalisi MNKrid dsniiiatiwi* ^ 
NapeJUiwi WIS mil awsxs that a plan seuU not ̂  at^isvsd wi^sut sa­
lting tiM Meat ̂ st« 
Itiila Mapeism sxtsa^d Fnash emtxel &mx §9i^t» Gtast Britain s«al* 
i«sd tiiat hav intsxtsts ia £(Mlia Mii* in a gssNit daagsy* llntsy an ailian^ 
ms iMide bslaMNMi @iNiat i^itaia and iim Ottemn i^pitf-vtoish had sstabiistwd 
totalafls Bfypt sines lSI.7-MHrtisfshy firaress el ̂  twe seuntrits wettld 
seek dsfsat el Vtm fxtneh* In 1861, aiUsd treops siss^iad in 
aehisving tiiis pturpess, ai^  l^ixts-ytaar ztils el Fmnes evtt Eg^t mas 
tn<ted*^ l^mv9Tp ffapelsim iwis able te sow #i« seed el Frencli Wastsyn 
influtnî  in the e^try*^ 
1 I.A. Spsissr* jlgi Iteitsd States and the SEE liil (Co^dge, Mass.t 
Haxvard University Press» l55f)7 RP» 43-44. 
2 l*vii^ Seda* and ttiwjld ^enbexg* Bshind the Bovptian Strfiinx (Mew 
Yexkt ChiJLtwt Coapanyt 196CI), p* 15* 
3 
4 
llfliiMMd All* «fi to Ttoklsh ejUHpaSfii ig«inst 
isim F]»neh» ltd to 1832 « iniectteful idLlittfy nitifiy In Wswt tgttost 
t^xkish lite was Itft htlpless *^«n arltlsh troc^s evaouatad the 
eeimtsy* In 1806 Sultan of Bixkty umrillii^ly emflzned Moaned All as 
Sj# Vimsey ®f iSgypt# 
IXiiftog his £«i§fi ®f f®pty-t3««t years* IWjaBwd ^li bailt wUSi liie help 
of lojpiign assert and t«#uii«iaii6 a stf^ amy and navy. Ht Mpleyad his 
•Ifleltnt asuy alnest e«Matlniiimsly« exushed tlw Wahabl mv&it to Araibia. 
The l^ish Sultan refused te mms^m hto as the viett@y of Syria and the 
Iterea*-^ title which had been afteed bttween M^md All ami tlie Sal* 
tan befeote the E§vpt^n fleet pirtieipated* togei^r wltdi its Turkish 
0e»mtes|:>art* to the tettle of Nainttoo (Oetober S^* 1827) against the 
bii»d fleets ef Citato* Fi^nee* and l^ssia* M a result* Vk^uHMd All 
Kirehed over Syria and was steiqped Jast shfiort &f ̂  emnqfUMst ef Ti«rit»y it­
self beeatise ef totenwntiim by the great pi^rs*^ 
H^hamid All* semrally regarded as <^e feunder of no<itom Bgypt* totro* 
dueed aany Meded referee in eeeNROBle* a9ri<»ilitortl> and ellitary affairst 
but th«se tefoms c^ld not keep paee with a state and his death 
in 1849* the cmintry (Nsee agato lapsed tote pelitieal turmeil* His rule was 
neildier e<^nipt n&r wistefal and was free froR deatoatlcm ef the great powers, 
to contrast* all his suceessors* ending with Kii^ Far^k in 1^2, were incom­
petent* oorrupt* and under heavy foreign tofluenee.^ 
Hi& iuBediattt sueeesser, $a*id, granted Ferdtoand de Lesseps* an 
3 Speiser* fg. eit». pp. 43-44. 
* Philip K, Hitti* History £f iga Aaraibs (lUHidont SiieMillan and Co., 
1958), pp. 722-25. 
s 
aiBbitious Fx«n^ engin«tr, th« etmesssion to build tho Bmz Cansi in 1^* 
In 18^ Sa*id was sueceoded by Issaiii vi^e possossod a laigo nunber of 
shates in tho Canal Ceopany • Tho Canal was eoi^lotod tni qponod to 
traffie in 1869. Its censtrtiotitm cost U6 nillioii, of idiic^ igyptian 
gimttmnt paid a^t one-half* Soon XsMil*8 extiravagant livit^ sado hin 
sell his shares in t^e ec»pany to the Baritish govexiBaent» thus i»icii^ Bri* 
tain a idM3whol^» of tho Canal Conijany and a possosscKr of en 
stalQK in %^tiaft affairs. By 1679 Um govtimnint*s indob^<l»i«s 
had xeaeiMd UOO failli<m» n^toy CMfod chiefly to B^tish and Ffondh shato* 
holdersi eoyuRitJ^ tms on ̂  ¥0x90 of bafdcm^toy* Ftmwiag f&x thois' in-
vostaente» Burt^an exodite^s uxgod the fovemwnts of @to«t Britain ami 
France to take paronpt aetitm in ^rdor to seoire payaent of the ̂ bt* C<ki80* 
(fuentlyt tite im govozraeonts forood tho abdioati^in of Isaail in favwr of 
his son Tewfiq and began t& assert oontrol of Egyptian finaftoiil 
policy, the two govesiosents 1l'?«K«diately sptmsored a progrsa of recofanlza* 
tim of %yptiatt finances* Booauso financial refora MIS slovwr in progress 
than tms ojipootod, ̂  i^»atient Fron«ii eeasod to participate In it* leav­
ing Egyptian affairs to @reat Britain*^ 
Ihe iapositi<»i of fiurelfn control over Bgyptian internal affairs led 
to the AhRMid Qrabi affair in 1^1. Qrabi* a goiwral in the Bgyptian amy* 
revolted against Htm govermsent because it failed to rid Itself of foreign 
influence and because it ms csom^t* Otabi's forces oc^ied Alexandria 
and openly idiallenged Tewfiq. This brcRight an iamdiate protest and 
3 The Royal Institu'te of International Affairs* (hereafter abbrevia^d 
as R.I.I.A.) M M ^yyoy (Undont 
Oxford University Press* 1958}* p. 183. 
6 
ultimate Iron Great Britain. As Orabi refused to surremJer to the gove^m-
Esent in Cairo* the British fleet, upon Tewfiq* s e<msent» b^ibarded Alex­
andria and the British tro«ps to<^ possessimi of the city* Orabi*s revolt 
endted in failure and British occiiqpation of the country fceguni and for the 
next seventy years Great Britain exercised stresig influence over Egypt.^ 
* * «-
The Sjdant a territory stretching from Uganda in the south to the 
borders of Egypt at ladi Haifa in the north, had been an ^rvptian province 
since ̂ e reign of Me^aned Ali. The British, w^o had exercised a dominat­
ing influence in tite Egyptian gavezrment followii^ the C^bi revolt, had 
maintained garrls<ms in the ̂ dan. A revolt led by the Mahdi, a fanatic 
Sudanese religious leader, defeated a force of Egyptian troops led by a 
British officer. In 1893 the Mahdi troops were defeated in the Battle of 
Qadurman by a c«&bined force of British and Egyptian troops, and the entire 
7 ^dan was brought uncter the Anglo-Eg'i^tian control. 
This control was formalized by the Af^lo-Sgyptian Ccxiventicm of 1899. 
llie convention created a joint British-Egyptian goverraoent in the Sudan 
under the form of a cond^inium, which Lord Cxmmt, British Agent and 
c<m8ul general in ̂ ypt, described as a ''hybrid form of government hither­
to unkn<»Mn to international jurisprudence."® 
* * # 
^ President Gamal Abdul Nasser, expressing his bitterness against 
Tewfiq*s complicity with the British, statedt "The British had occupied 
Egypt wi^ ̂ e tacit cmisent of Tewfiq following the patriotic revolt led by 
General Qrabi...Tewfiq feigned acceptance of the reforms demanded by Orabi, 
M^ile openii^ t^e doors to the British «^o sought a pretext to justify an 
occupation of Egypt." Garaal Abdul Nasser, "The Egyptian Revolution," Foreign 
Affairs. Jantiary, 1955, p. 199. 
^ R.I.I,A., cH. 419-20. 
® Ibid., p. 421. 
7 
At the outbreak of World War I, Hgypt y&s declared a British Protecto»-
ate, a saasure aimed at ending Turk-sy's nĉ ainal sovaxeignty over Sgypt. 
The Sritish declaration stated* 
His Sritannic Majssty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
givts notice thst, in view of the state of war arising out of 'ttia 
action ®f Turkey, %ypt is placed under the pxotacticm of His 
Majesty and »idll henceforth constilaite a British Protectorate.... 
His Majesty's Goifexnawnt 5d.ll adopt all masurss necessary for the 
defense of igypt, and protect its inhabitants and interests.^ 
Wten the mt entted in 1918, %yptian nationalistic feelir^, *#ileh had 
been repressed by the British, burst into actiw lift under the leadership 
of Sa*ad Zaghloul. Zaghlmil deaamited e<^let% and isn^diate independence of 
the ctMintry. In 1919 he went to ̂  Paris Peace Conference and laid his 
countiry*8 demnds before the (Sreat Peters. Zaghlmil's oissi^ proved fruit­
less. However, under increased Egyptian national pressure. Great Britain 
agreed t© end the Protectorate 1922, with the cmdition tiiat British 
forces remain in ̂ e cointry Wfitil 1936. 
Many masures had been introdkiced to the country after 1922, such as 
the institsition of a cimstitutimal goverraaent, tiie establishflaent of a c^a-
prehensive state-su|:^^ted ecbication, and the sending of diploamtic nissiewis 
abroad, ait Egyptian nationalists did not dxqp their deaand for full and 
unconditi^l independence. The Wafd, a party founded by Sa*ad Zaghloul, 
contiraied to cai^jaign vigorously for ttie eanplete »*ithdra««l of all British 
troops and tiie restoration of the Sudan to Egyptian rule. After a (tocade of 
continued struggle on the part of the Wafd, Great Britain and Egypt con» 
eluded a treaty on Au^st 26, 1^6, replacing the unilateral deelarati<»i of 
9 Carol A. Fisher and Fred Krinsky, Middle East |n Crisi8**A Histori­
cal and DoctBBentarv Review (Syracuse, N.Y.i Syracuse University Press, 
I9597rp. 75» 
8 
1922. Ihe new treaty wis designed to establish a aors cordial relationship 
t^tMsen the tm countries.^® 
The 1936 treaty finally recognized %ypt*s cc^lete indepenctence* 
Moreover, it provided for the reaoval of British forces fro» Cairo and Alex­
andria to the S^ez Canal Zi^te, British spcmsorsh^ of Egyptian s^mbership 
in the League of !^ti®is, ami tiie ahandonnent by Britain of the right to 
protect minorities on Eg^tian ̂ rritory. Great Britain, hme^r, reserved 
the right to utilize Eg^tian eoiMBunieation facilities and the right to 
defend Egypt extemally, wliich included -Gie use ©f Egyptian sell for this 
puxpose. Ihe futore of aidan wes a natter of ftirther negotiatiims.^^ 
^en the treaty was signed, many ^yptian patriots loelconed it as a 
step toward regaining complete natl<mal sovereignty. Kmsever, the outbreak 
of World War II proved to scxsethlAg else. %^t's desire to raaintain a 
neutral posititm between the tmrring parties «as handicapped by the exls-
tance of ̂ is treaty. More over, QSYP^ once agalji i^casae a major base for 
British tafoqps.^^ 
Durii^ tt^ war period, Sritish limjlveEMint in Egyptian affairs wient so 
far as to present King Farouk in February 1941 with an ultimtira recpestir^ 
the disnissal of the existing govermoent for showing pro-Italian tendencies 
w.B. Fisher, Middle East (l-ondon* Utethuen & Co., 1956), p.150. 
J.C. Hurewitz, Dipl«aaev in t|w Wear and Middle Ea^t - A Doaimen-
tarv î cordi 1914-1956 (Î dont NostranT̂ ., imTTh' 203-lI. 
Colonel Sadat, Nasser's partner in the Revolution of l^, st»BiKd 
up his disgust at this situati<m by writing i "At the ^tbreak of hostili­
ties, Bgyptian policy had been defined....but in fact it seened e<|uivocal, 
because t^e idea of neutrality tMas precluded by Egypt's military obligatis^ 
under the 1^6 Treaty. How cwld ̂ ypt rei&aln rmitral, Mhen British troops 
occupied tiie iwhole cmintry and controlled the bases, G(»nunicati<ms, ports, 
etc." Anmr El-Sadat, ftevolt m the Nile (New Yorki John I^y, 1^7), 
p. 
and its feplacesent witi) a Hbfdist gwemment headed by ttustafa Nahas* 
The demand teas granted, and Nahas eoi^rated with ^e British until 1944 
when he was ousted by iiiie King.^^ 
Hms at the end of World i^ar II, ttie 1936 treaty seemed but a veil 
unc^r «diieh foreign ocoipati^ of the country c«jld be sanctioned. Egypt 
then renewed its demands for iensediate witiidrawal of all British troqs, 
inciudii^ tiiose statiwiad in the Suez Canal Zme, and for its union vdth 
the SiKian under the Eg^^tian Croum* Negotiation for the revisitm of the 
treaty l^gan. Hoover, Egyptian atteiqpts to charge "Ute treaty in such a 
way as to obtain coqslete sovereignty and imiependence for the country niet 
str^ British resistance. On July 11, 1947, Egypt took case to the 
Security Council of the United Natims, pleading that the presence of Bri­
tish trm^s on Egyptian soil was incoiqpatible with ̂  Charter and the 
spirit of tite United Hatictfis.^^ Mo action was taken by the Council, and 
the matter ms left for future negotiation between the two countries in­
volved. 
Unpromisir^ negotiatiois between Great Britain and Egypt dragged m 
for three years. Finally, <hi October 15, 1%1, Egypt unilaterally abrogated 
the treaty of 1^6, ami declared that it wcKild no longer be bound by the 
treaty. It also denounced the C^dominium Agreement on the Anglo-Eg^tian 
Sudan} the Egyptian parliament proclaiiaed the Sudan as a territory under 
the Egyptian Crown.^^ Britain vigorously repudiated these measures and 
l^on l^itish advice, Egypt did not declare war on liie Axis until 
April 1945. Because Prime Minister Ahmed Maher declared tiie war, he was 
assasinated the r»xt day wdiile attending a parliament session. R.I.I.A., 
SSBl* £il*» P» i®"'' 
United Natiwis, Yearbook gf the United Nations. 1947-1948. 
Anwar El-Sadat, cit.« p. 118. 
10 
consldlered herself not boui^ by theffi* Ali^migh aany Astern observers had 
inteaprtted these actions by Hgypt as being attei^ts by tite g^mrrment t© 
divert fwblic c^inion from the defeat of Egyptian troqjs in the Palestine 
vrar, there is reason to believe that the wain cause for -Uiese acti^ was 
an Egyptian aspiratl^ to assert the right to be severeign in its &m 
country.^® 
Toward the end of 1951, tiie goverra^nt allowed police and irregular 
guerilla forces to attack British military posts in the Canal one. The 
toitish forces retaliated by attackii^ an Egyptian police station in 
Isfflailia and killed sewnty policea»n. On January 26, 1952 anti-British 
rioters dem^strated in the streets of Cairo, and soon turned into uncon­
trolled mobs taistiir^ many buildli^s and killii^ thirteen Britishers. 
King Farmik dissaiissed the ^fd govermsent for inability to ccmtrol the 
turbulent situatim. In the following five ®©nths Cairo becaae a scene of 
changes of indecisive g<Mrer»a%nts. Finally, m July 23, 1^2, the "Free 
Officers", an (Hoganization of nationalist officers in the Eg^^tian army led 
by General Naguib and Colonel Ganal Abdul Nasser, put an end to 
the alsost chaotic situatiwi by overthrowing the regime of King Faraik.^® 
Ihe new regine, headed by ^irteen army officers knotm as the Revoluticmary 
CoBi^nd Council (BCC), introduced many reforms in the social, econosic, and 
political fields during its first few weeks in office. 
* # * 
J^rfm S. Badeau and R.H. Nolte, awroence of Medem Eqwt (Head­
line Series, toiber 98, April 1953), pp. 22-3. 
IM Tiflws. Jamiary 27, l%2, p. 1. 
Ibid., July 24, 1952, p. 1. 
Before turning to the revolutiimary era» it Is necessary to take a 
brief at Egypt's z«lati<ms with the Itaited States and the Soviet Ifrii^ 
prior to the Revolution, 
Fxlor to H^ld ̂ r II, the United States tmas little eoncen^d with 
political events in the Middle Fast. Certain American gr^Hips, it is true» 
engaged in such activities as missionary, eckicational and eoramrcial. Ihe 
war brcKifht mit Aaeriean strategic aiKi political interest in area. Al» 
most on the eve of tlie attack on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt cbclared 
that the defense of tiie Middle Hast was vital to American security. Presi-
(k!nt Truaan, in April 1946, observed ^at the Middle East, an area with vast 
nalairal resources and a strategic locatitm, was closed of states that 
were "not strcMfig enough individually or collectively to withstand pi^rful 
aggression."^^ This was cmsidered a c^ftfiiwation of Roosevelt's declara­
tion of the iai¥>ortance of the Middle East to Hvs United States. 
In genez«l the post-war era was characterized by increasing American 
involvement in the affairs of the area. This eiMrgence of U.S. interest in 
the area was related to two basic develo|»ients. The first was the presence 
of tjte Soviet threat in the Middle East exeiplified by Soviet re^sal to 
with^w its troops froBt nortl»3m Iran and the Soviet pressure on Greece 
and Turkey in 1946. United States' promises to Greece and TUrkey tiiat it 
wmild assist them to deter Russian aggressiwi by force if necessary helped 
to ease f^ssian pressure on ti^en. Professor Robert Strausz-Hupe, stressing 
this develoi^nt in inrii^ing liashingtcm to play a i&aior role in the affairs 
of the Middle East, statedt 
Ernest Jackh, Background of the Middle East (Ithaca, N.Y.t 
Cornell University Press, 1952). p. 397. 
12 
Even without the Soviet eliallenge, the United States 
stiil might heve been dravn into the affairs of the area. 
Yet Ajaexican Initiative would have been confined to a mintor 
of 1(^1 and highly seleetive issues, and even in l^se the 
United States would have confined itself to its txaditiwial 
roles of iBoderator, offering its good offices before the bar 
of «w>rld c^inion ar^ counselling the pr^er legal procedurei 
of trader» seeking oarkets and scMnd investments; and of 
genermis wentor, endowif^ schools and spreading the blessings 
of universal» secular educaticm. The United States can still 
play these roles and, indeed, does play them. It has been 
forced, howeirar, into another unaccusttKaed and peril<ms part, 
that of the strategic ringnaister of •Oie Middle Hast.^® 
The secmd develtjpasent ms the decline of the pcwwr and prestige of Great 
Britain and France in the area after World lar II. The dudndling of influ­
ence cf the 1»*o Hur«^an powers desasstrated by the grant of Independ­
ence to Syria and Lebanon by France, and by the conflict between Great 
Britain and Egypt over termination of the 1936 treaty? ttiis devel(^:»aent led 
the United States policy inkers to seek mys to fill the "vacuus." The 
United States, beii^ the leader of tiie Astern bloc, realized that the posl-
tl«i of the Middle East was the keystone to any effective Western defense 
plan against Conawnist expan-siwa.^^ 
Jack Winecour, a Middle Eastern affairs specialist, coafiimed that it 
was the United States rivalry with the U.S.S.R. that brought American 
er^agement in the area*s affairs, but also pointed out that there exist­
ed a British-American rivalry »Alch resulted fiij® British jealCMsy over 
United States expanding influence and British contacting power In an area 
»i4tere she used to be the unchallenged master. He explained that the latter 
rivalry was overshadowed by the overall conflict with the Soviet lAiiati in 
20 Robert Strau8a»-ftipe, "The United States and the Middle East," 
Tensions In the Middle £ast edited by Philip W. Thayer (daltisioret The 
John Hqpklns Press, 1^), p. 4. 
Ibid" P» 5. 
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vilileh botii V^shingten and Ltmdtm wetre engaged* Ite believed ^at tiiis Brit-
ish-Aaerican rivalry contributed to the advent of an "inctependent Amsrican 
"ZL 
policy" t^(i«rd the Middle East* 
The United States* pursuance of an Siidepemient policy toward ̂ e Mid­
dle East was demonstrated in the question of Palestine* In 1947, ̂ e United 
States played a leading role in securing lAiited Nations* approval of a 
resolutiewi recoraoending partiti(»i of Palestine into a Jewish state and an 
Arab state* British preliminary resistance to enforce a decisicn was e«in-
tered by a United States su^estion of an international tru$teeshi|3 for 
Palestine. SQ^en the Uni^d States proposal failed of acceptance, Presidk»nt 
Trumn recognised tiie new Jewish state upon its ̂ claration of inctependence 
in 1948* 
AiBerica*s role in establishii^ the state of Israel and its stahsmg si^ 
port of that state since 1948 antagcmized the Arab world and vias b<»ind to 
beccxne ^ne of the oajor obstacles to friendly relations between the United 
States and the Arab Middle East* this observatimi was particularly appli­
cable to 1^0 relations be^en ̂ ypt and the United States* Tha hunilia* 
tifflfts suffered by the ^yptian amy in the Palestine war in 1948, as related 
by ilie Egyptians, «ns due to the en^iy's superiority of BOitern weapons* The 
people of %ypt were c<mvinced bey^ any doubt ̂ at Western refusal to sup­
ply tiieir a3HBy with WKlern aims vas ootiwited by the Aaeriean govemaaent's 
cksire to prasenre the existence of the state of Israel. The Egyptians 
were also indignant at the extensive United States econoeic aid to tite Jew­
ish State* The U.S. dollar was ccmsidered a major factor in saving 
^ Jack Winocour* "The United States and l^e Middle East,** Middle 
Eastern Affairs. August-Septenrber, l%4, p. 
14 
Israeli Qcmmnf fsm dventnal ianlcruptcy.^ 
B|vpt abrogated the ti^aty of with Ortat Britain m Octobar 
15, 1951, Oni1»d States S#cr«tary ©f State Dean Achasai ariticiiwd Egypt's 
aetidn as ci^trary to ini^matlonal law.^"* Hjis stateaent ms interpretdci 
by as fttfther evider^e ©f active American ̂ ositi^ to the ccwn-
tary*s »8tional asplrati®Rs. 
The success of the North Atlantic Treaty Csrganizati^ in cmittainir^ 
Soviet pwwr in Eurof?^, followed by the cecmunist aggressiai in Korea, led 
lUsshii^t^ to iiie conclusi^ ttoat Ifestern influence wist be oiaintained in 
the Middle Bast. Siiuje it was obvit^s that the "old exclusive seiii-ii^rlal 
trsaty relationships were l<M^er tenable," the Wnited States and Great 
Britain id^ of ntiltUa'texiil refiimal def^ise pacts as an 
wilii ti» Westesn bloc replacing old iraperial 
Oa this basis the tteited States, together witii Great Britain, France, 
and Turkey, presented the Egyptian government witii a pr^osal to cj«ate a 
Middle East Defense OrganiaMtion a few days after %ypt's aharogati^ of 
treaty of 1936. Bgypt was told that she c<»ild join the Organizatitm as an 
e<^sl partner mltk other petsers and that <4ie British tro<^s in idte Canal 
ZfflT-' rjQuld be replaced by a ct^ined force of ttie Hm countries I.e. the 
Iftiited Stitas, France, lUrkey, Gsreat Britain aiHi Igypt. Eg^t*s "resentiaent 
^ Between 194i and IW, Israel alone received half a billicm dollars 
in eiNmeiBie aid fr^ i^e United States as against $3C^ railliim to all ̂ e 
Arab cmintrles. A,J. Meyar, "^flections c«i An̂ rican Hcontadc Policy in 
 ̂mm» net,- Kiddle Eattern Affairs. June-July, 1959, p. 233. 
^ IM In October 18, l»l, p. 1. 
25 B«I.S. Ralei®h, "mddle East Politics—Past Ten Years," Middle 
^eten^ Affairs. January 1959, p. &. 
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it tNi pmitim of tite tinited States m Palestine"^ and Anexiean st^oit 
to Bzitialt poiiey in ̂  pzesent Angle-igYptian o^flict caused eoun-
try to irajoet tite {s^osal* fhe Eg^n^tian goi^rnnant insisted en the inned* 
iate and tmoi^itiofMil witiidxanal of all British taroeps free the Canal Zone 
isefose it ««ild even o^idar enterii^ a paot with the Wast* UNt planliad 
to be held in abe^^noe**^ 
* * • 
Prior the Seoond World lar, the Soviet tftiion did little to z^dnd 
tiie EgYptiai» of its existenoe. This» hi»«everf dees net aean that the Sov­
iet iMim did not ai^reoiate tlM» iUaportaneo of the strategic positii^ of 
Egypt and l^e Az^b w^ld to tiie set^rity of its territory. In 1^6, tiie 
Soviet Itoiwi sent a Itesl^ delegation to the All*Mi^leK C(8)gress in Itecea 
28 
ai^ s^itfted King tim Sai^ in his olaia to tiie Calipha^* Bie nea«ure 
was directed against King f^*ad of Egyptf vlio also mnted to prc^late hii^ 
self the Cal^ of Islaa* Ihe Swiet acticn was i^tivated by the 
^itii^ policy of the govertamfit in Cairo* 
this Wis c^^idored ̂ e only Russian activity in the Mi^le East until 
otttil^Piak of World lar 11* As fox tlw activities of le^l Egyptian Ceo-
nonists* tbeir first ai^aa»nee was in 1919. The Cenninist group ceased to 
exist thJEoe years la'tor* because of its atteqst to revolutiwiize -^e 
^ Rallrfi l^mdhot Intx<^ctien to 2e Hear Bast wad ttte Great Powers* 
edited by Richard N* Frye* (Caii^ri(i^e» Mass.t HarvaxiHEiiwrsity Press» 
mi), p. 1. 
^ Paul U Hanna, "Aaerica in tt» Middle East," Middle eastern 
AffiiaFS. May 1959, p. 182. 
^ Moahe I«sh«a» ^Soviet Propaganda to the Middle East," Middle 
Eastorn Affairs* January, 1953, pp. I-IO* 
g$v»s%we{it as well as political, soeial» and irtligi<»ts instityitions «ndi 
traditions in eouiitry. Beeause of l^so intandod radial ohangcs* ttot 
Egyptian gowemnsftt stq:^x«ssod thai? aetivitios* Quiring tiw 1930*8 tJNi 
C(»n!Hiist party its aetivitias» lAit it itsad tbe Birq^an C@»f 
fflunist parties • taeties of infilferatiiig th» natiofial Ibr^ts. ttea ifyptlai} 
Coanunists nem cooperated with tte aitti-eoionial natiofialist aevmwnt* 11m» 
eBdrg0iiee of a strong workins elesa <^ring vmt slseng^ened the Ctmtiii-
ists* position. The isffledtste post-wsr era edtti aRti*ie#t feelings 
in Egypt gave the CawKinists a n&n powsr.^^ this power, hfiwev«r» vias 
eclipsed as a result of Itossian support in the Ursited Maticms of the estah-
lishflient of ii» Israeli state. 
Diplc^tic relations were established belaioen Mosctm and Cairo fat 
first tJjfta in 1946. Ihis iisas followed by the elation of an Ambio pvvgtm 
by radio Moscow. During the Anglo-Egyptian tensim over t4» Bsse in 
l^, Soviet pr<^aganda advocated the Bg^^tian eause. Sreat Britain was 
severely attacked for its att^ts to illegtit^ately waintain her eecM^tion 
of Egyptian soil. Badio Moscow intsnsifiod its attacks against the Westexm 
bloc in gasieral vrftan Egypt ma prassnted ^ pr^^s^l tf ereating a 
Mi^^ East Taraaty C^anization. Turkey was aeoised of tr^^ng through this 
seheme to revive Ottonan Eapiani at the eiqpense of ̂  Arab sovereignty. 
Turkey also ms called the bridgehead f^ iUaeriean ii^rialism in the Middle 
Bast. Bven Israel, whieh had reeeit^d so iKich support from the C^minlst 
bloc sines its creation, was called an agent of Amsrican ir̂ rialls®. This 
was an obvious attempt t© arcsisa antl-A«erictn sentia^nts among the Arab 
29 y^slter Laqjuer, "The Appeal of CoasEiunis® in the Middle Hast," The 
Middle East Journal. Winter, 19S5, pp. 17-27. 
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pe<^le. The Moscow n<iio» Mhilo pointing to Ai^lovAmriean rivalry in «t<» 
t«npting to ̂ eupy «nd oig^loit Ou) regiwi, nentievM»d Hat both cflMRtries 
Hers pi snsning a unifiod policy in tryii^ to suqpproao luitiwul aspintiens 
tmxag po^lo.^ 
Lashes, |g« cit> See also, Le«mid 1. Strakhoirslcy, "The Kature of 
Soviet Propaganda in the Kear East," |h£ Hear Bast and the Great Powers. 
edited by Riehard N. Frye (Cai^rid^e, Ks.t Hirvaxdiy^rsity Preast 
1951), pp. 65»9. 
CHAPTER II 
FROM MMM TO NASSER 
The July 23» 1^2 moveaent 9f ̂  Sgyptlsn ai»y achiti^<d weh sueeess* 
The speed nhlch the amy wes abjye to ovestiirew -^le gmmxnmntp seia» 
the eeuntry» and feret the abdieatlen o# the King aattj^d way peeple in and 
caitside Egypt, Memrnx, to lh®se «li® were well amre ©f ̂  iweiits that 
to«^ pl3«e in the Efi^tian peiitieal i^ater during taii fmxt v»tT$ priwt t© 
the 1^2 €OCTEi d'etat, the matter i«i»ild sew rather 8lif>ie« ^peated fail­
ures In political ccmfliets «d.th Gmat Britain intensified the dissatisfae-
tien ef tt^ msses «d^ tl^ rulers* These xtilers wxe aeeu^d ef eellabe* 
rating with j^itish i^riali^ in or^r td aaintain their positions and to 
exploit the people. The disastrous defeat in -^e Palestine vi«r eoni^ised 
the fflinds of the i^^le af»l the asny*^ The defeetive smi vdth viiieh the 
ansfy was sullied te fi^ht Urn Jewish state mro revealed to Urn public* 
Many BgyptljRs believed that Urn Palac« was directly csfus^eted idth purehas* 
ing these iB|>erfeet »xm* The six n^ths titot pre<%»ded the llevelutien» as 
we have seen*^ was an alo^t diaetie juried* ^reading strikes* violent 
street ai^ ths existence ef indecisive qmrntmrnt^ effeiNid 
str<sng ppe€»f of the iailif^s of tiie existing regliae. -
It was generally believed that the "Ainy was only nati^l insti* 
^tiim in B|^t t^t csuld provide law and ®rder« tnd ̂  «Kiiy dymade ele« 
laent in a disrupted %yptian sta^ that could assum #ie tiiie ef politi««l 
arbiter.*^ 
^Mireal Coloi^t "igwt turn #ie Fall of i^reuk to the ̂ Itermry 1994 
Crisis-, i^le Eastern Affairs. JNaie, IfW. p. m» 
^ Sttgta. p. 8-9. 
^ P.J. Vatikiotis, JM Sgyptian Aim in Pelitics (Blooeilngtoni 
Indiana Wiiversity Press, l%i)» p. 71. 
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Takli^ tlwix' cue ttm son» statWMiits by &u»il Abdul Htefts#? tliat th* 
rolft after the sueeess of eeup d'etat was <mly te be *iit^ 
fr^t for a few bcRirs***^ nest Wts tens edmesKNirs eonsldered i^t the sieve* 
sent ef J^ly 2^ did mt have a dbtaiied pl«i te be eanittd eut stafes* 
Here is hmi em #f tiiese Observers destribed general sentloefit ef the 
Free Officers iJH^diately after lite sueeess ef ^eir rev^ltt 
Wiat is ̂ rtein is tiiat they were {»atrie<Ni am 
ef geed will* anlaated by «Ni desire to geed 
ar^ fm ̂  welfare ef eennlxy* But 8«mii 
Hiey were Hm4 ndlth diffioilties irtii^ eeaviaeed 
tiiett that best intesitiMis a^ will mm mt 
en«i9h te save Egypt free N»r pr^letts*" 
The abe«« au^er believes ̂ at it is unkiiewEi vifeether the cew& d'etat was 
oiie of ^in 0f events lliat kept -Hw eeuntry in tyoirail sim&e Werld Mir 
II or if it was meant to be a revelutiffin* Huit is eertain is that tiM sm^ 
ceeding events ef ̂ e first few pz^srrad that a real rei^lytien was 
in the pr^ess in Egi^t* "New it is plain that a new pe>litieal force has 
taken eentrel ef Sgypt# a foar^ which represents a fresh podat #f view and 
pregras of drastic change."^ 
EMring the first two h^^s of its existef^e» i0m new regiflw shewed 
little tmmm with intesmatiwial affairs. It cwicentratid B»t ef its ef* 
forte en t)M solution of Bgfypt's denestic pn^leott* (^at efi^Krt was Made 
to eonsolidate the ruling xegiee by i^trging its ae^l «r po^n^l 
Gppi^nts. 
4 6a!i»l Abdul Hasser, ̂  Sl M& (Buffaloi 
Keyiwe and Marshall Publisherst 19&9), p. 32. lihe book was first piblished 
in Arabic in CaiaK>» 1^« 
^ COLAAAJO, SSL" SLS*» P* 
^ Joim S. ̂ideally "ifeere is Egi^t Going?" Fwreign Foliev Bulletin. 
NoveiBber 15, 1952. p. 1. 
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In tha field of foreign ralations, it ms evident that tha military 
regies m$ pro-ftostern and anti-Russian. Th« amy's crackdwMi ©n local 
Coij«jkni3ts wittiin tk# first few sseeks of tha revolution strongly supports 
ta0 anti-Cosmmist teiK^sncies of the new region. On August 12, 1^2, tjie 
leftist labor unions in Kafrud Damr, a textile industrial center, staged 
a d®fflonstration shouting "long livt the Aray's Revolution."^ Folic® and 
aM»y troqas bittled sith th® rioters, killad nine of them and vsj«mded aany 
othier$. General Blaguib co«d@fliied th« event, branding it as "Cwasmiat-
inspired stritet.**^ Leigh '»'3iite, in supporting this b«ll#f (the mw 
pro-lssterii attitud#s)> has statedi 
Th» Pme Officer's tnti-Coawunist trend is I^yorrf 
any dcMbt.«..Th®y s«»ild be @vsn aora antl-Riissisn 
and px&^AmrlemB I tiiink, if the U.S. would be 
less cautious iimn it has been in assisting tiaguib 
tad ̂  Junta te attain l^ir i^dest ee^oaic and 
p«litieal objectives.^ 
After 8 auceeseftil att»i^t to sestore tranquiility to tiie naticm dur*-
in^ the first tmo n<»iths of the Itevolation, General Kaguib began to seek 
solutims to the tiiomy px^leai ef AnfIo*%yptian selati^ans* Early in 
Oe1»^r l^ie tsf© govemraents C|>en»d negotiations on ttie futtire of the 
S«^n. General Ntfuib, and his representative in the ^idan "handled ti*e 
I A 
sitaiatian teteirably well." The old Eg^tian practice of not c««iceding 
^ right of »elf«deter»lnatlon to the Sudan was abandorwd. 
Keitfe lii|»«ldck» liaaMty's Sew Eg^t (New Yorki Frederick A. Praegar, 
Ptiblisher, I960), p. 14. 
® P» 
^ *The Blessed Revolutltjn*, Harpers. Jamiary, 1953, p. 87. 
Itekki Shibeika» Thg Indtmeradten^ ̂ adan (New Ywki Rdfe»rt Seller 
& Sons, 1969), p. 4^« 
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Hw mw §«mmmnt i»99tiatwl uttii 1$m s^fmrntiaU (ihwa wb# 
m indtepai^tnt Sudan) and ̂  mlanists wltd mm to fovaar 
of an %i^tlafK^Miiiaaca mdm) pattlaa* Bi 1i« past ̂  §mmm» 
mnts of t» ia»3.iida sapaxatitta IJI any M)t9tiati<M 
IN» tetttta ef liia and teeanda^ ^mi at BadLtiah lapatialiat 
st<H»@aa. Itatft @afMi«it lii^uib*$ ̂ ffme ta dis«isa tlia is«ia tha mpmt?* 
mm a powasirfiUl ta Bgypt pzaatliKi ttm-
all pellti'eal faettens in fly> ^iiiii* 
Tha fia9^iati«ma l^taSn asuiad wi^ a hiat^ic avant, Hm sifii« 
ing af aa af»mn»iit 9ml§*4f^WBSmiAJm tm ̂ a ̂idaii m MmmtY 
12» 1^. the fallcmliii la a i^ntaxy af ̂  ntn pravlai^M ef this agtaa* 
nantf 
Cl) m aairly a^etia» fiir an aU sMinaM Paxlia* 
aiaitti a^«vii«d hf a ntieM il»ctenl CoMdsalm 
of Mwan imRlwxa (Haern Sydamsa^ ana 
m» %yptiaii| ana wmAt aa a 
ehainMHi an IMljui)! \2) a tamnaltiaiMl pariad of 
i^ll »alf<-fCM«»MB(Kit $f iMt «a»a tibiaii ^tnaa yaarst 
in flKdar td MiaJbJto tlea Sadtamsa paopla ̂  asearctlse 
Idiaiir aalf*dataxadmtiaQ Sn a tew ai^ iMittzal 
(S) a i^pae&al a«i«git^a taaplaia 
^ "Sudaniaatian* af tha /MWbtiatzatiany W» 
^iea# ̂  S^n OafaiiM ^»6a« alNs«t «itii|n ̂  
1^a*i^a« paariadf (4) alaetian af a CenatiHiaiit 
Aatai^ly ̂  da«i<te il^ttaw ataiNa ef 1^ 
and ̂  p»^fa a aanatitutiaiit (§) > da«iaieii «n 
tih« ftttiara af tNi Sa^a Ca) liy #ia Canatitiiaat 
Aaaaiybly liidc ilia S««ten wi^ Sgfi^t in 
any ftmt air Cb) by ̂  C«ia|itiaant Asawably 
iMig aenptota locikg|>aiKianiM«^ 
Badtls}! Fraraign Saexataxy Edan eautionad tlia Haitsa af CarawMns 
m Hio day tha agxeMent waa alfn^t daalaxlfif i "I Must aa|p^asi2a*»«.that 
Ibid., p» 489, 
"Oiwilapcgant o 
partaant Sullatlii> Fabasuaxy 22, i«4» pp. 280-1. 
«0tva iieB f U.S. PaUay in tha mddla &tt," U.S. Stata Da-
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l^is is not an binary instanee of a dependent toraritozy proesedii^ towjrd 
soIf-0ovemBient«*«*The]« axo mny eoqplieaticms axisingf frm tha pa^liar 
stalsis of the atdan as a Cmdiminiun**'^^ It is intexest^ to contrast 
t^is statement with ̂  mm iptlnistie view of U.S. Seeretiry of State 
Ji^R Fo$1»r Dulles* vino believed that the British, tiut Egyptian* and ths 
^danese pestles sbmild view tlie settlement '*wi^ e^l satisfaetion as 
ai^r^riate to their respective inl^Msts* aiKi as providing a solid founda-
ti^ for friendly* outually benefieial i^tore relationships."^^ 
It is eomnanient at this point to trace briefly ̂  subsecpent history 
of tlui relations between Bg^t and tl» Sudan. In the mttxm of 1^ a 
general election wis held in ̂ e ̂ an «Mch resulted in a victosy fw the 
ashikk*a (BrotJ^er8 Alliance)* mito canpaigned for union witi> ^ypt. Isns*il 
al-as^ri* tl» leader of the a^ikk'a. took office as ̂ e Priro Minister. 
this was c^idered a setback to the pro-British IftacM (Pet^le's) Party# 
However* al-Azhari radically changed his pro-Egyptian policy *fcen the cw-
flict between Naguib and Nasser resulted in the expulsion of Haguib freei 
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his positlm as tiie PriisB Minister as k«11 as the President of Egypt. 
From Idiis tiae on, the ajtdan follo^sed an indopendent policy in its rela-
ti(»is witii her neighbor on the Nile. 
Next t® l^e Sudanese q^iestitm came the thomy problen of ^Itish 
As quoted in J.C. Ikirewits, "Britain, Egvpt, and the Sudan," 
Foreign Policy ailletin. March 15, 1953, p. 1. 
"EWelc^paaent of U.S. Policy in -ttia Middle East," U.S. State 
Deoartaent Bulletiit* February 22, 1^, 280-1. 
The ^danese tkveleped great affectitxi for General Naguib lor two 
reasonst (1) his unprecedented move to grant then Om right of self-
determinaticu), and* (2) Haguib was bom to a Sudanese nother and lived his 
chil<fiiood in the Sudan. P.J. Vatlkiotis, c|;|»* p* 92. 
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irva<0i«tlaR tsm Canal Zmm, BmHxs ^dsn agx^eeant was slgnei* 
Celiiiel llh(a»B3r» tlM «ie««)d 9txm§mt aan in the military zefiae, it 
eUat %^t weaXd denaiKi tiie wie^itiemal eiraiei»tieii @f fereifn 
ttmsfys tier 8#ii* He stc^#^ Wnls via* t® a Briti^ eoxirespofKientt 
YCNI elaim tluit y^ms acrny in ̂  OAIML Zene is ^ERE 
t© k»i^  atissians out. I tell ym its presence 
is the greatest eingrle i^staele to ̂ e defense ef 
the MicMle Hast# ^ hate the British occij^ticm 
andty if ymi don't f# «dUir^Jly» m shall li^ht**** 
ISe shall nst sifo any Defense Pact as s €<mdition 
®f yeiir fein§* Yew Mtst §o**® 
With this deter»i«ati®rj the Egyptian Qoverraffisnt epened negetiaticms 
witfc the ̂ ited Kingdoa ®n the Canal Zcme in Cairo on Aparil 27, 1^. A 
quielc ^ttleaent of ̂  issue ms hindered by the disagreement betmen the 
tm {iNirties as to liiel^r the Sudan would be free to choose ssisbership in 
tiM British 0«n^iiiweaith* 
C0l«iMil Kasser pahlicly stated the Egi^tian position In a press inter* 
view two weeks before tibe negotiations began. He pointed cut that Egfypt 
was willing to maintain the Smz Base, and tl^t since Egypt by itself m$ 
unable td prwide neeessary technicians, it ms willing to allow Bri­
tish f«rs®nii«i to take tiie responsibility of providing technical aid fooe 
^ Mkia^nanee of tiie base. Kasser, however, ®ade it clear titat this 
^«ild ii9t be intex|>reted by the British govesmsient as a veiled occupatiasi. 
Ife tlwwa reiterated his previews deelarati^ts tJist Hgypt would not join a 
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ctofense treaty with the Wfest as a price for the evacuation.* 
Tlie two delegaticms cor^ueted extensive negotiations, but disagree-
ioents arose over the numl»&r of Sritish technicians to be isainfeined in the 
21s las Stataanan and Hatia^. Jamiary 17, l^. 
2a JJSI Tiae«. April 13, 1953, p. 6. 
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Gtml ittogth @1 tia* 1m «hleh tsehnieal aid w^ld be nee^d, 
and British inslst^ocie m its right te re^nt^r tite Zem in tise of mt* 
Egfpt b]^« off ti» ntgetiati^a ®aly ten ̂ y« after tliey had started.^® 
Hotisver, eentaets betwe«n Cairo and Ixmdm o^icemlng the Canal Zm» 
prebl^ Mere renewed m ^ly 30, iS@3. Joint e«minicp» issDwd at l^e 
cutset of ti)e e^f^mrsatiiKts s^ted ̂ at possibllitiee of agreement 
will be fear-UM»r ei^lsared by ̂ is mians before diec»i8si<ms are resided* 
No cona^'te deeisioas were agreed iq^on* and m September 4, tiw British 
dblegation left f&t after holding six aeetinga vWi the Sg^ti«R 
gever»ent< 
^rther negotiations were «leadl^i^ until Jhjly 11, 1^, On l^is 
data, a British <itele0atii»i rei^f»d dlseussion with tite Egyptian au1^@ri» 
ties m the fixture ©f the Smz Bum* On July 27 an aiceord entitled 'Tfiea^ 
&f Agreeiient* wes reaohedf it provldkid f&t the vdthdraval of 83,W British 
tro^s froB the Sims Imm ndthin tmenty n^thsi base «fas to be iiaiao 
tained by tine Egyptian go^^maeat wll^ the assistai^ of 4,CKK) British 
teehnieiana Hearing eivllian elo^sj a«kd, in Om evwnt of an attaek 
any s^aatKry to iBie A»»b CoUeeti^w Seeurlty Pact or iipce 1\irkey, British 
troips would have ê right to pit Suez Base under tlieir disposal. 
^Itain and Egypt waived all fimoioial elains m eaeh o^r arising froa 
the previous British oeoupatlon* Ihe 1^6 tmaty was abrogated by (3z«at 
Britain (Bg^^t had already abrogated It in 1951 )• Finally bo^Ui parties 
a ffilled ̂ Ir deten^natioa *to uqphold ^e 13@8 C©nstantineple C^ventiim 
*8y 7, 1^, p. I. 
E»«t ImmmU ^ronology,- Atttaan 1953, pp. 507-8. 
pwxftnttolng ftMden of in ̂ o $mz Cwi*!.*^ 
in 'ttie aeoosNl ms x>e3««lted 1^ sen* wiib siwptieitti* 1h« Brit* 
ish gcwofiaMat Justified it im tlM» gx>oini(li i^t tlit ew(»»iti<^ of British 
tr^s free SsftPti*^ toi^it<^ wie i«»tivstt<i by ̂  ̂sif« to mintsin firiond* 
Uor imlations Ggy|>t in the frnmn simI i^t adwii^td adliitoiy 
aadit Canal iaso less lap^etant bof^*^^ 
In Oiirot tlM %yptian govsn»wint hailod agiraesiont fm haviaf fin* 
ally liboi^ittd soil froe **|a|)Orialis»'** iwts loss ffim^sis 
in ignn^t i^mk ia Btitain m tho prei:^siti«fi iliat a§tooiMmt vnstilti l^in^ 
isottar tolati«ii8 Imtmm two nati^as. Missor aanoiBioed to a huge sally 
in Caiiro that *'CiM stafo of our s^eugglo \a» oi»ted and a now stafo is ab«»it 
to Nfin»"22 
« » « 
tho eoiifliet h»lmm Goiwral Haguib and ColOMil l^si»t, liiioh xoaohod 
its i^ak In early 1^» goes book to 19!^. Free Of floors pii^d Hagaib 
IMd.. mimtk 19@4, p. 4IN3. the Cimstantiai^lo C<MiiNHiti«i» 
was signed (m Oeteber li^ by Britaint @osmny, ̂triaoHyingiaryt %ain» 
ftanoe* Italy* ̂  li^tiborlaiids, %ssia and iroxlny» eo^posed of sovsntoon 
artiolos dealing wiHh t«iiiilati^s insiuo ̂  free use of ̂  Bmt Canal 
for inteimatiiMial navigation^ Tho oen'^aeting partiss agreed n«^ in any my 
in^rfexo tiie frte use of Oinal» in tint of mr as in tim of 
poaoe*" Aooflotding to Artiele 9 of the Cemmntliny ms iMthorised to 
*tafai ne^ssary aoaimres fme ibisui^ the emcwticm of the treaty." 
Artiole 10 granted Bgwt tSio right to 4iim ̂  passage thr««^  Canal to 
any country at mr nd'tii in order to soi»ire "the defense of Igypt and 
the miatenanoe of f^lie order.* See ©ovomaent of igypt, tMte Paper jtg 
Sa Wtti^liration $i ̂  m»M Marltlwo Canal CoiPany W^tro ̂ jwomaent 
f>ress» 1956)t 
^ M iitnchostor ©uairdian Wwkly. August 9, 1984. 
22 IE. fit.* p. 197. 
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fe; jUNidtxshlp beeausa of his i^apitatloR as an hm&st ganttal and his 
high t9iA» m»mw nms tiiea tiit ma^lmT of ̂  ammmntf aiMi h* hioBsif 
mado the plan fox* iMiloeting the fonotal* «9M»n Hie Revolutlm 
Kaguib held tlie Ism highest titles to Wgfp^^PtmsiMnt and Pxiaie Minister* 
ilMt Hasstr was esoareising eon^l emw the activities of ̂  f@we»»atnt 
thmi^h ^olutionary CunniMi Council C^)* ttm IOC was fomed ianed-
lately after the viiei^ss of Rewelution and ms ooqdrised of eleven Free 
Offieers plus @emral Hagiiih. *1^ flSCC was real power behind the gov* 
emEBent* Mijor govorment deeisi^ had he passed hy i^Jwity vota of 
its aeaiters* Al-^oti^ih Kni^ih possessed i3v» top p^emition in tlM> gove»»ant» 
he was Ixit ̂  of the Ms^rs of ROC tdth a stogie vote. 
(Seneral f^uib, ̂  jian whoa tiw Free Officers wanted to he tlie figure* 
head of ̂  Hevolutienary xegIUM, hoeaae Ijmensely pqpiilar Egin^tian 
iaasses. In Oetoher 1^ Ifesser and his assooia^s appoto^ tiir«e new 
iMlnisters to the Cajbinet wi^o»t c»istilting ̂  Gofwral.^ Ni^ih prot^s* 
tod tlw aotim* Qmfident of his ovor»ridtog value to the r^toe* Wtquih 
^sianM tmm autiiority to 4imtt tM affai:ini of ̂  stat^ tiian ms dele* 
gated to hia hy tho BQC. He requested a veto p^r owsr aetii^s of tdie ̂  
rattier tiban his sii^le irate* Hfeen these d^nds «ie»i not laat he resigned 
m Felsraary 29« 19&4. liiA rosignati^ was aoo^tid» ai^ Col^l Hasser* 
**tlMi ^ief architect of the Revoluti^ an^ the d^dnant persc^lity to ^e 
nx, and tho Ban nost cleai^eadsdly devoted to #iat he has called 
dreaa of an %ypt free and str^,* heeaae leader to mm as he had 1^ 
been to fact***^ Nasser* ̂ s» ascended to the prmiiorship wil^ the 
^ J««ohlA J<»sten» Hasser. the Rise to Pmmst (Lw^iont tong Acre, 
1960), pp. 102-3. 
^ Ri#iard Holte, "Egypt to Twnsitim," Foreign Policy Bulletto. 
July 15, 1954, pp. 1-2. 
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pi^sideney JDsmining ̂ ^nt* 
The g«v»raEffi»nt*s sfUMiunecNBent tkit liaguib tMs$ dismissed beeause he 
sought <iie^t®xiai power did not satisfy masses in Cairo* Naguib MS 
hailed as a Biartyr« and si»e«i ̂  students and the pe^le d^nsruded Hmt 
^ir bel«(ved lea<lter be reinstated to t^e presidency. Sinilar h(»(tility te 
lesser Mas deaenst»ited by the ̂ danase pe^le* Even the axisy urns split 
witfn tm large fa«ti^ deaai«iing ttie return of Naguib# 
Cenfrcmted with tliis ©ritieal sitwatie®, Kasser consented to the re-
tiHm ©f Ma^ibf four weeks after the letter's resignatien. Naguifo again 
beeaae ttw l^sident» the Prine Hinistar* and t^ Chairian of ROC* 
Capitalizing on his pepularity* he announced ttve emi of transition per­
iod arwi that Ig^t ms ready for parliaoentary life* The press started its 
eaapaign for civil liberties, ai^ Naguib proaised to meet its dewnds.^ 
Behind the scenes* Masser was vigerwisly «^ing to consolidate his 
position ^e areiy* the police* ami the tradte tini^. He obtained new 
s«^ort sosie elements t#io feared that ̂ iguib's appeal to the peqple, 
would make hia the captive of extrem wafveronts. Ittese el^>nts were also 
worried that Naguib*a latest »®ws were dtesigtied to i»instate ttie old are-
gi«e* 27 Qrj April 15, l^, Naguib m$ once ®ore es^lled, now for good, 
and ]^t un<fer hmse ariest. Masser retailed his previews positiw as the 
PriJEBe Minis'ter, and, in effect, ruler of Egypt* 
2S Ibid* 
^ BE Hast J«imal. %ring 1964, p. 186| see also P.J. 




W THE EGYPTIAN-CGIIWNIST ARHS DEAL 
The change of Adteinistraticm in lashii^ton in for«ight witi^ it a 
new approach to the United States* peliey tcmard tiie Middle East. The 
TiniBsan Adffiinistratlsn believed that liie Suez Zmm had te be maintained by 
^e Western Powers if an effective ctefense for the Middle East ms desired. 
F©r this reas^ tdie United States State Departaent had almys supported 
London's posititm that British troqps w^ld net evacuate unless %ypt would 
bectMse a member ©f a Astern sp^isored security pact in -Wie Middle East.^ 
John Foster Dulles, tiie author of the r^w approach, twjred the Middle 
East in the sprii^ of 1^ in order to get a direct view of the situati^ 
in the area.^ He devised the "Northern Tier" concept to coe^nsate for the 
ir^vitable surremier of the Canal Base to i^^t. Hie new Secretary of State 
was convinced that Cairo «^ld never entertain the idea of joining an ex­
clusively Western alliance as a price for British evacuatitm. The Northern 
Tier concept wras a shift of ea^jhasis simi a Suez Base-centered defense sys­
tem to a defense system of ccmtainment of probable S^iet ejqpansion in the 
Middle East by grouping Middle Eastern states in a Western oriented 
alliance.^ The countries within this area were Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and 
Pakistan. After he reached Washington from his Middle Eastern tour, Dulles 
reportedi 
^ Keith Stieelock, |£. cit., p. 2CB. 
2 Ibid., p. 214. 
3 J.s. Raleigh, "The Blast and ttie Defense of the Middle East," 
Middle Eastern Affairs. June-July 1955, p. 177. 
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A Middle East Defense Qcganization is a fytsirs 
rather tiian an iamediate possibility* Many of the Arab 
countries are so ei^rossed with their cparrels ̂ at ̂ y 
pay little heed to ttie meoaoe of Soviet Csomnism. 
Howaver, there is aore concern »^ere the Soviet IMon is 
near. In general, the "Sorthem Tier" of naticms shows 
av«areness of ̂ is dai^er. 
Tt«(re is a vague desire t© hav® a collective security 
system. But no such sys^n can be ioposed fxm wi'^out. 
It should be designed and grow from Kdtiiin out of a sense 
of cofinaon destiny and dai^er. 'lOiile aviaiting the 
foxtaal creation, United States can usefully help 
strengthen ̂  interrela^d defense of t^ose ccmntries 
wiiieh urant sti»ir^th> not as against each otoer or the 
Ws$t» but to xesist the coisson threat to all free pe^les. 
During his Middle Eas1»m tour« Secretary Dulles understood that Iraq 
would be t^ie only Arab country to be Initially included in ttie alliance* 
HffiNsver, the United States wcHild pursue its encwrageTOnt to other Arab 
states to Join it. 
Proceedit^ witJi the plan thus conceived, the T\irkish-Pakistani Pact— 
the cornerstone for the aore cooparehensive alliance—mas cc^ieluded in 
Jaraiary 1954.^ Tluis Washii^ton has succeeded in laying the base fm the 
Northern Tier. The toited States reacted by providing aassive military and 
economic aid to the two C(»mtries. In Iraq and Iran official stateiaents 
ware issued welcoming the tww alliance* In Syria> altiimigh govenuaent 
welconed the accord betmen Turkey and Pakistan, it cautioned li^at tiie Pact 
«»s a non-Arab one and tiiat the Arab states should refrain fro® takii^ any 
decision until the questic^ of Arab participation vas discussed in tiie Arab 
League Council* va^en the question of Arab sta'tes* participation w®s dis­
cussed in the Council, laost metier states ei^ressed (^position, a 
^ Depaftoent of State ̂ lletln> June 5, 1953, p. 835. 
^ Jules Davids, "The U.S* and the Middle East,** Middle Eastern Affairs. 
May 1961, p. 130* 
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resolution ms adopted declaring t^t the Arab states **w«ild not aeeept any 
resptmsibility undarmining ttieir sovereignty and imtependince, or inet^ipat-
ible witt\ tl-i©ir rasponsibilities as asmt^rs of the Arab League.*^ The 
resolution vies coasidared a defsat for the pro-Hestem gofverraaent of f^ri 
es-Said of Iraq vthich favored Arab participation in the m\n Fact. 
Arab objection to joining toe Turkish-Pakistani Pact—for t^iat letter, 
any systean of alliance witii the stest—v«8 laainly instigated by Egypt* 
(It my be i^called that as early as 1^1 Cairo rejected any military as­
sociation with the 5^81.)^ The new Egyptian regin® regarded any jsove by an 
Arab state to seek meobersh^ in the new Fact a defection from the Arab 
solidarity and the Collective Security of the League. Egypt was also isKjr-
ried ̂ t unless t^e Arab ««}rld solidly supported her stand for unccmdi* 
ti<mal withdfawal of the ^itish frt»i the Canal Ims, her bargaining power 
in negotiatir^ a satisfactory settlemnt of ̂ is <pestion wc»ild be aayeh 
weakei^d.^ 
Until the signii^ of the Suez Agree^nt in July 1^, Dulles had 
achieved sctcie suceess in cc^incing ti^ Bgyptian authorities tiiat the net; 
AdBBinistration in Washit^ttm had chained her policy to one »ore favorable 
toward the Arab world. EXirii^ his visit to Egypt in the spring of 1953, 
IXilles prfflBised the Bgvptian goverm^nt ttnat the Uni-ted States wwld per­
suade Great Britain to evacuate the Zone within a short period of tin^. On 
July 15, l^. President Eisertfjower declared •Oiat tiie United States would 
^ The New York Tl^s, April 2, 1^, p. 1. 
See page 15 
S M, Pertoan, "The Turkish-Zirab Diplaiaatic Tangle," Middle eastern 
Affairs, January 1955, pp. 13-17. 
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make "fii® cfflamit-bMnts" to Egypt with re§a3?d to military and econffiaic 
assistance if Nasser would arrive at a satisfactory settlement with the 
British.^ '#ien the Agreeiaent ««s signed between Britain and Bg^t, the 
Aaexican goveaewaent expressed its gratification and hoped for better rela­
tions with Sgypt. 
In %spt as well as in tiie O'Uier Arab states, a hqpe developed that the 
Eisettfiower AcSainistration «Ki«ild inaugurate a new American policy c<s«cem» 
ii^ Ute Arab-Israeli conflict, a policy inhlch wi»tld pay due regard to Arab 
interests awd be charael^rized by "s^athetic and friendly impartiality."10 
The Arabs h<^ed for scae redress of »^at they »>garded as past injustices. 
ajt from the Arab viesipolnt, little, if any, of these h^s material­
ized. Stiile the United States ms persuading Britain to evacuate her 
troths froffl ttie i^yptian soil, Dulles cowJucted certain activities that 
were considered as working against %ypt's anbiticms. The encwiragemnt by 
Dulles for Iraq's enterii^into a defense treaty with l\irkey was a move in 
apparent conflict with the non-CMfflittaeBt policy advocated by Nasser. 
Itien Iraq did sign the Baghdad Pact vd.tti Turkey in February 1^, and later 
s®s joined by Britain, Pakistan, and Iran, Egypt ms furious.^^ 
With respect to tite Arab-Jewish ccMnfllct, Egypt believed that the 
Elsenhovser Administration did not change the prevlmis Admlnistratl<m*s pro-
Israeli policy In the Arab-Israeli conflict. Israel remained Washlr^t<m*s 
^ New York Times. July 15, 1^, p. 1. 
"(^ir Stake In the Middle East," Current History. Nowober 1^7, p.285. 
il Harry B. Ellis, Challeni;3e to Middle East - ConaMnlst Influence 
and Afflerican Policy (New Yorki the Ronald Press Company, 1%0), p. 38. 
12 R,i,i,A., op. elt.. p. 2£K)| see also Joachim Joesten, cit.. 
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"spoiled child" (attiflil wieitellel).^^ Her big share ©f Aaeriean Foreign 
aid was not reduced, {Up to 1959, United States govemnent gifts* loans 
and grants ammmted to i^arly $500 raillion dollars, ̂ hile all the Az^b 
states c«Bblr»d received less than half this figureX^"^ 
Althoii^h t^ie United States goveriment signea in Howiaber l^ a $40-
million econcffiiic agreei^nt with Eg^t t© help latter devel^ iier 
indistrial res<MJtrces, an Egyptian re<pest to pmrehase aodern ams did not 
B®et a favorable resp<mse frewi lashlr^ton.^® MeaniAliile Israel was con<feic-
ting regular raids on Arab villages. Se^ral Israeli attacks on Eg^tian 
ailitary posts, especially tt\e raid in Gaza on Feh«iary 28, 1955, were 
conducted fedth superior military loobility that created fear ©f prospective 
Israeli e^q^ansionist aias.^^ 
The consecpences @f all of tihese events—namly, the establishment of 
the Baghdad Pact, the uns<^athetie Aaerican policy temrd the Arabs in 
^ The term was pt^ularly used by the Arabs. 
14 See footnote 25 on pageM • 
Harry B. Ellis, tsp, cit., 40-2. 
Fayes A. Sayegh, 1||e Arab-Is^ell Cwiflict (ifew Yorkj The Arab 
Infoifltation Center 1^), 71-3. It vK»2ld seem appropriate here to 
state that sc^ae l^stem authors accused Nasser of being responsible for 
creating tiie tense situatic^ between the Arab states, especially ̂ ypt, 
and Israel. Joachia Joesten presented ̂ is viewpoint as folloi^J 
Coniando raids contacted at night on Israeli villages had 
started in the spring of 1955 frees the (^za Strip, the slice 
of desert v^ich had nmined in Egyptian possession after the 
armistice in 1949. Sexm, the raids were being conducted from 
Syrian and Jordanian territory as well. The nightly assaults 
cm the civil p^ulation of Israel were i^tehed by daily broad­
casts from Cairo radio in wdiieh Egypt premised to grind Israel 
to <fcist. 
See IB. s||., p. 153. 
tijelr eonfllct with Israel* and the withheldir^ by the iestezti bloc of aims 
shipient to Egypt—siere imaediate simJ fax-areachiiig. Eg^t's powerful pr^a-
ganda aachin# started beaming out "anti'-ifflparialist" slogans designed to 
make Arab pec^les thri^hout the Middle East ej^ose Aaariean policies towsard 
the area* Nasser found iafflediata respcmse froia -aie Arab nasses wfto eonsid* 
ered him an Arab rat^r tiian oerely an Bg^tian lea^r.^^ 
* * * 
Ismediately after ttte Gaza raid of February l^, Nasser intensified 
his apfieals to the Aaerican governoent to provide his ar®y with military 
equipEKRt. He »®nted first the purchase of SICK) million worth of artts» but 
^en he fcHjiui no response he x^duced his order to $20 million worth of 
Atuerican weap<M»s.^® His efforts again ended with failure* Harry B. 
Ellis described ^^e epis^ this myi 
The American Embassy in Cairo* realizii^ tiiat the a«^nt 
of arms vniiich could be b^ht for titls swi (J20 million^ 
would not ei^ble the Egyptian Army to defeat Israel, 
strongly favored idie arsas sale. The ̂ ibassy was ctmvinced 
that Nasser wanted the arms primarily to isaprove the morale 
of his tro^s and to counter growing unrest in the Army* 
Negotiations dragged on ̂ rmigh the spring and sua^r of 
19S3* Nei^er Nasser nor AggJl^assaddr Byroade ce^ld obtain a 
definite answer frora ^shingten. 
In July Byroade nade a final a{:^eal to the Departoent of 
State, urgii^ that favorable actii^ be taken on the Egyptian 
request* He suggested that, shmald ̂ sser not get ̂ is 
coffiparatively s^ll aoKwnt of arms, he would be forced 
either to seek ai»s elsev#iei« or risk the dlsaffecti<m 
of his officers. In the end, negotiatiois broke down on 
the Binor point of «3iether Cairo vnmld pay for the weapons 
Harry B. Ellis, 0£. ci^. p.39. 
18 Ibid., p. 42 . 
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in doXXats m Egi^tian pmtnds*^^ 
iXXis ci^tinuad cm to say t^t «h«n ̂  negotiations tndsd, tha Soviat 
AedMissadc^ in Cairo effo^d aros to igypt in hugs (pantitias**ai»<mt live 
tinss 1^0 aneiint %ypt twanted to p4iip^s« itm Aaeariea—and "wit^eut edi­
tions •** AX^«»^h Nasser did not even infoxai aost of his Cabinet iBeid»«s« 
he st»Hi<»ied the Amxiean ̂ liwssador and toXd hie of oflev* H^wvtjr* 
news of the iHissian oflex Xeaked to the ig^tian amy «nd people who 
ed an imnediate aeoeptan^ of the olfe^r* they oaiM to the 
oXusi^ now itiMt the United Statos was favodting IturaeX* and that tiie ius* 
sians were sufHPorting the A^b cause* Ntver^Xess* Hssseir stalXed fox tm 
wmths before he decided to accept t^e ConMtnist axBs« 
Finally* en Septei^y 27, X^» Hisser aimetinced to a hs^ ralXy in 
Cairo titat he had esncXttded with Cae^oslofwikia a oassiwi §m»mnts agree* 
sent (later ̂ sser adidtted that Cxei^Mlowakia was a itmt for ̂  Soviet 
tftiitm)*^ It imis a barter afrewMnt Hereby igypt wmiXd pay for the ams 
with cotton* %ile t^e contents of the ag»i«Mnt were never revealed to the 
public* tinctmfixBed reports stated *the a«i» received wmild reach a total 
of about $dO ailliflDt with the individual weapwis priced at a fracti^ of 
^Sr real value**^ the fHirchase wml4 include 209 1116 Jet fighterst 
1(K) tanks* 6 sufaoMirines* and SOM artillery#^ 
Ihe Nsstern Powers were shocked at ̂ is daring and iin|>reee<tented 
Xbld.. (ei^shasis added)f see also jl«§. itews and ̂ CTld Report, 
4, im, pp» 48-54. 
^ USH &S Tiaas. Septeirijer 2S, lfS5| and October 26* 1955# 
^ SJI Middle Eastern journal. "Chronology*" Winter 1966* p. 65. 
^ Mi-
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Sg^tian mm. The Fmeign Minlstsxs el tlw United States» the United 
Kii^dw, and France expressed grave ciKneem* U.S. Assistant ̂ retary of 
State George Allen arrived in Calre en Septeji^r 30 in a futile last-miimte 
attenpt te dissuade Nasser freei eer^eting the asm deal.^ 
Israels the emmtry i^st e(NM>e3^d abeut Eg^tian armanent free tiie 
Swiet bl©6, retarded the new develqpnent as pesinf a serious ̂ reat t© her 
existence. Pieoier Meshe ̂ arett protested t© tdie Swiet and Czech gwem-
wmts against their selling ama to ̂ ypt. He also asked Urn U.S. State 
Beparti»int t© proeilse his cwintry iriiatever arsis reeded to match Bg^t's new 
Military strength.^ Siailar notes were delivei^d to the British and French 
foreign ninistrles. On Septeidser 29, 19^» Premier ̂ rret e}q:>ressed to 
the Soviet charge d'affaires his nati(6Mfi*8 grave eencem at ̂ e deal and 
reqpies1»d ttie Soviet representative to obtain clarification from his gov-
erraoent of its Middle last policy.^ 
Israel argued that aiiile her request for svqppiyirg her ax»y with modem 
anas was merely for defense |»j^>08e, %^t's intention was for aggressi^. 
It seeB»d as thiugh Isj^el's argiment a convenient rati^ialization, for 
Israel was Buch to blane for tite new dev^lii^i^nt. Before Israel be^an her 
regular raids of 1%5, Premier Masser was rightly described as a 'Moderate. 
His main attenticsn was devoted to secure coi^lete sovereignty for his 
^ Mi* 
M igw Times. October 11, 1955, p. 4. 
^ Middle Eastern Affairs. "Chrmtoiogy," October 1%5, p. 331. 
R.I.I.A., cit.. p. 197. Bwn as late as early 1962 Nassar ms 
described as having •'never been fanatical abmat the Jews." Kingsley Martin, 
"CtmversatiGW with Nasser,** Ihe Hew States«an iSi Natiwii. Jaiuiary 5, 1962, 
p. 6. 
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country and to etmcentrate on raising tite Eg^tian 9emmiy to a respectable 
level. 
first Israeli aaiear attack that created fear thr<Mgh^t the Arab 
world in 1^ occurred in Felmuiry vftten a regular Israeli artay attacked the 
Gaza Strip* killlr^ tSjirty-eifht The United Nati^is Security 
Cmmcil conderaied tills 'prearranged and plamwd attack ordered by Israeli 
autiierities*».agait^t Egyptian army forces in Gaza."^ Four »©re Israeli 
raids were conducted across Egyptian truce lines, and on each occasion 
substantial losses were inflicted up«m tiw %^tian defenders.^ Hg^t, 
lack^ effective i^taliatory raesns* relied upon the paramilitary feda^n 
(guerilla f^hters) ̂Idi infiltrated Israeli tezritory. ^ile tiie 
fedaveen certainly disturbed Israel, their exploits were publicized in tiie 
lest far out of prcportion to their actoal dteeds.^® 
Coraaander E.H. Hutchison, a seiaber of the Iteited Hations Truce Super­
vision OdEiganization in Palestine, described l^e repercussicms of t^e Israeli 
3ralds m the Bgyptian political scenes 
The Hasser goverraMnt was in a precarious position. 
To take nilitary actl^ against Israel tvould be 
courting defeat and to take no action would cause 
tite goven^nt to lose face, not onlv at horn but 
in tiie otiier Arab countries as ws 11.^1 
Thus Israel could be described as the priiaary elei^nt which brtx^^ht abiHit 
27 E.H. Hutchison, Violent Truce (New Yorki Etovin-Adair Co. 1956), 
p. 117. 
^ United Nations Year Book 1955> p. 33. 
29 E.C. Hutchison, cit.« 5^. 111-23. 
30 Keitii Wheelock, P» 233. 
Og. p. 119. 
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the r»w turn of events in the Middle East* 
The Bgvptian purchase of C^minist axsts «»s distorbii^ to l^e United 
States bit had bro«<ter significance. It was for '^e (Hixpose of pleasing 
igVTpt and the Arab world l^t the State Qspartawnt had n^ked so strenumis* 
ly to secure the Suez Base agreesent* Dulles had h^d ̂at after British 
trolls withdrew fro® tl^ Canal Zom Egyptian relations with the Hast wsuld 
be greatly inproved and that Preatier Nasser wmild entertain the idea of 
Joining a defense pact wi^ ti^ SIsst* The azisis deal with tiie CoBsxmist bloc 
served a blow to all of these calculations. For two reasi^s Washington re* 
garded the new devel^pnent as a dangerous Russian offensive in t^e Middle 
Sast. First* tiie develo^»nt wcxjld give the Swiet ̂ ion i^Kce influence in 
the affairs of the Mi^le East, thus ̂ e Soviets wmtld realize an age*old 
I^ssian dream of securing a doninatir^ position in this sensitive area. 
Secondly, providing tiie Bg^tian aimy with huge quantities of nodezn ams 
would profkice an arms race between the Arab states and Israel. Thus, ac­
cording to Washington belief, peace would then be^extremely hard to nain-
tain in tive Middle East. 
Soviet bloc premises to extend a massive military assistance to a non-
Conaunist c<mntry—%^t—reflected a new aspect of Soviet foreign policy 
in the post-Stalin era .^2 xhe Soviets found in the %^ti8n ftfe»ier*s non-
aligriaent policy the very objectiim they were persuading the Afro-Asian 
countries to adc^^t. The Stalinist regine*s iMre noral support of Eg^t in 
her c^flict with Britain ma now changed to material one as well* In 
order to challer^e the West in every possible way the ̂ sslans were *'soft-
32 Wladyslaw W. i^lski. Peaceful Co-Existence - An Analysis gf Soviet 
Foreign Policy (Chicago* Henry Eegnery Company, 1^977 PP* 216-17, 
PEDALING" ''Ideology and stressing the wiry ̂ iing itfiieh ID ̂  past 
has glwn an aihrantage to ttMi Mssti* i.e.» xeailii^ss to extendi Bilitairy 
assistanee to the A^rab emtntfies, whidi ai^ anxiius ixt tiranefont th«ix 
patriotic a^ixatims into mality.^ 
To Bgypt, the Caminist ai»s ̂ al irepresen^ the iUievitable aove 
«iiich would guarantee tivi eoitntx^'s safety against mhat tiie Igi^tians etm-
sidexed ti^ie es^nsi^st designs &f lsx«el» Pgypt was "{:Miz'ehasin@ aims 
81^ not l^ologiess" lor eultuxaUy and ireligiwsly it M»tld be inpenri^s 
to Soviet doetrines.^ ^sser was ocmfident tiiat his ecKmtry "ean take a 
Red gun v^thi^t any dialeetie weraj^ingst and fly a MX6 plane wltiiout 
havii^ to spmit Marx or Lenin."®® 
^ ¥era M. Dean, "Struggle for Middle East,* Foreign Policy Bulletin. 
Jamiary I, If^, p* 60* 
Heal Stanford, "Can U,G. St<^ Hussia in ̂ e Middle East?" Foreign 
Policy Bulletina No!nMi)er 15, 1955, p. 35. 
Mi' 
Qiknm m 
jm C€^0VERSIAL HI@H ASNAif tm 
{i8>§ED m-m) 
Bi* Hifh Dsn 11^3.4 b* swm-
t»m tiaes tlian the ̂ at 
Pyxanids* im l^oiisaiKis ef 
yeefs heine been foreaiest ^ 
mrmls ef w^ld, e^feirting 
ioaMortility m tlw Hiatoehe* 
Qmoil Abdul ̂ seatl 
Bgi^t's uns dtotl witii tiM Ceeminist weirld in SkipteidMjr 19@S» a t^en 
Of^ireeedtnted tmm mmm TITO Axab statesi aaretssed SHI^ appxeNmsitsi in ̂ e 
lUnited itates and ̂ tato* that lieatesn blee ma c^ecxi^ imily ndth the 
peesibili^ ef Csamtnist infilt^atiim in if^t tiuren^h tim Seviet blee's 
technieal and atilitaxy assistance* As a emsitexmem to the likely e^^iv* 
sien ef Swiet inflMnee in Bgypt* the fov«zf»»ats ef l^e United states and 
Britain inf^^aatd Bg<^tian f^mBieir Nasser in DeoHiawx 1955, ef ttieiir idlllins* 
ness te ex^nad finaneial aid te build tilie nieh publieii»d High Asmn Qatt*^ 
Ihe High Bwn m es»Sed el«>Ali mas the emmtMUm ef gramiiese 
eem«ffii$ il»vele|NB»nt plans fe^nalated by ̂ e new Egyptian xefiM. \t t0 
finan^ the dan was a fexnidable ptetolan. liw tetal cost wis estiaHtted te 
be in 9xm»n ef eoe billien dellays.^ Sinee Bf^t he^rtelf m» unable te 
piNSVi^ liie neeessary iN»ids, af^^aroaehed #w g^imnents ef the IM^d 
States and the iftiited KingdiMi and the InternatiemI Bai^ fm fieecinslxuetiim 
i Qtio-tod in Joachin Joes ten, jg« pp* I20»l* 
^ <22# fiit»> p« 202* 
^ Haapty N* Uomwd^ "The Develepsaent ef United States Policy in tte 
Near Bast,* |l.f# Pepaytiwit ft §ta.te Btillatin Apadl 9, 1956, p. 12. 
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and OiVtl^^pfMiit (v^ld Baidc) in late 1^, seekingi tlwir of 
project#^ 
tMf years af-tor igypt piaoid her af^licatima with the West fm tiia 
fiRaneial si^^M»rt» no definite answer me fivea by the Mistem f^jmnents 
ear t^e Wi^ld Bank. %^t> iNif|>dratel.y unitinii to start w&xk m daa 
site, leit that the Itestern finaneSjig offer was prolonged uniwcessarlly. 
On Oeteber 13» 1955, an official %i^tlan spokesaan declared that tiie Sov­
iet Uiii<m had offered t© finaivse §f»^d el-All.^ A few ̂ ys later, the 
Egyptian a»ijassador in Mshia§tm lnfoi»ed tim State Departoent that his 
govemisint mild p^fer to have Hbste^ rather tiian Swiet help in ecn-
structii^ the daffi»^ Th«i§h Premier liasser ciBifirmd that tiie Swrilet Uitliai 
had fflsde Hi® offer several tiiaes, he e«s^sized his preference f®r a Isst* 
em offer* 
CfflRfr^tted sdth the possibility of a seriaws Soviet eswje»ie cei^eti-' 
tien in Middle East, t^te Unitad States and the ̂ teitad Kingd^ on Deeem-
b%x 17, 1^, offered to assist Qfs^t in the initial v^erk e<»iRacted wi-^i 
the laiilding of the High Asmn D»®»^ tJInder ttis Western offer, a total of 
$270 ailUon mal4 be raiaed in ttie following *«yi a loan of $200 «illl«i 
fr€» th® Wwld Bank at 4 per cent interest, a §ra«t of $56 nilli^n fro* ̂  
tAtit»d States, and a grant of $14 KUli^ fron Britain*® Die fownweffts 
of Miat ̂ raaany, France, ami Italy also aimoiii^d their xeadiiMSS to 
* Keith itieeloek, |g,* ci|*# p* 187* 
® |2I IISS* Oct^r 141 1955, p. 4* 
6 October ISi 1955, p. 3. 
7 Middly East JgiMriMil* "Chronology," %rlng 1956, p. 182* 
@ Joachin J^stan, jg* cH*, p* l^. 
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contxiliRite eonsiderable mmnts*^ 
Thust effort to seek financial assistanee to build her giant 
project* Kliich had aroused little interest in the Western tworld for tv^o 
years, was now given full consideration.^^ Despite Secretary DuUee' 
statement that "tne inter&st of the U.S. and of ti^ !torld Bank in this dam 
goes back two years and more and is not attriixitabl© st all to tl-ie Soviet 
prt^osal,**^^ It «sks evident that the Western offer was «ade <mly after the 
Soviet Unitm had ann<ainced her readiness to assist %wt to kiild th® High 
E^a. An informed observer stated that in the absence of its "fear of Mos­
cow's economic penetration in Egypt", the West «K3Uld probably ha^^ not ser­
iously entertained the idea of financir^ the project.^^ 
Negotiations between Egypt and the Western Powers to iu^jlement the 
United States-British-World Bank offer soon tegan* The World Bank zequired 
Egypt to follow a scamd fiscal policy and to avoid inflatism, which sight 
impair Egypt's credit. The Bank also sti{:ailated that Bgypt oust reach an 
agreesent with the Sudan en the problem of adjusting lorater distributi^ 
after the dam has been constructed.^^ The Egyptian goverm»nt pieced that 
these conditions «^ld be observed. iSien the Soviet AsAjassader in Cairo 
remarked that the Soviet IMitm still intended te participate in financir^ 
the High Bam "unless there is seoetiiing in Egypt's agreenent with the West 
^ Mi' 
V,M. Dean, "Strt^gle for Middle East,* gg. clt.« p. 60. 
^pa^rtiBent of State Rilletin January 2, 1956, p. 12. 
V.M. Dean "Aswan and Suez," 55. cit.. p. 6. 
13 Keit^ ̂ eelock, cit.« pp. 189. 
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«toich specifiealiy txeludes us,** a U.S. official replisd that ftissian ex-
clusiw was ifflplied tn the issteapn offer.^^ 
In June 1S^6, Soviet Foreign Minister Dimitri Shepilov visl^d Cairo. 
Al»Ahraa« a Cairet^ dally, reported that the Soviet Foreign Minister had 
again polnttd mit his country's td-llln^nees to help Egypt finance es-'Sed 
gl-All. The pap^r added ^i^at he had pr^dsed i^ypt a $1.2 billion-dollar 
loan for the purpose. The loan ms to carry two per eent interest and 
was to repayable over a period of sixty years.President Nasser, 
however. Bade it clear that his country was still favoring the Anglo-
American offer. Ha Instructed the Egyptian ambassador in iashlngtwn to try 
17 to reach 2 final agreesient with the An^rlcan goverranent. However, before 
the ambassador had a chance to carry «Jt the Cairo instructions, he was 
summoned on July 17 to the State Depsrteent and ms handed the following 
memorandumi 
At t^e request of the government of ̂ ypt, the 
United States joined In Decea^r, 19^, with the United 
Klngdcra and with the World Bank in an offer to assist 
Eg^t In t^e Cf»)structlon of the High Dan on the Hlle 
at ksmn* Ibis project is one of great magnitude. It 
wmild require an estlnated twelve to sixteen years to 
cswplete, at a total cost estl»ated at sorc 1.3 billion 
dollars, of nlileh over $9(K} fflilll^ai represent local 
currency requlrei^nts. It involves not merely the rights 
and Intersts of Egypt, but of other states tdhose waters 
are contrlbiitoiy, including the Sudan, Ethiepia, and 
Uganda. Ihe Deeeffiber offer e^te^^lated an extensl^ by 
th United States and the United Kingdom to grant aid to 
Mi' 
Tia^s. June 23, 1^6, p. 4. 
In June l%6, Masser, by a vote of 99 per eent of all Bg^tlan 
eligible voters, was elected President of the Egyptian Republic. See 
R.I.I.A*, C|^. p. 2SG. 
Keith VOieeloek, jg. clt.. p. 193. 
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help fiminee c«rtain early phases ®f the werk, the offsets 
el «^ich wmild be confined solely to Sgypt^ and with the 
understanding that aeci»^lishnent of t}^ project as a «^ole 
wiHild TO(pire a satisfactory xesoluti^ of the questi^ of 
Nile mtBs rights. Another i^>ortant considerati^i bearing 
upctfi the feasibility of the umlertakif^ and thus the prac­
ticability of Aneriean aid was Bg^tian willingness aiMl 
ability to concentrate its econ<a«aie resources upon the vast 
reconstruction parogran* 
Developments within the succeeding seven m^^^s haw 
not been favorable to the success of the project^ and the 
United States govemaient has cfmcluded that it is net 
feasible in present cireunstances to participate in the 
project. Agreement by ̂ e riparian states has not been 
achieved* aiKl the ability of figypt to dtevote adequate 
resources to assure the project's success has becem mmee 
uncertain than at the t^ the offer v^ats aiade. 
In the ef^» the note e^qpres^d United States* hc^s that the withdrawal of 
the offer \^ld not is^ir Aaerican-lgyptian friendly relations amJ pro­
mised American co^ration in aidir^ Egypt to iafjrove the econooic condi-
ticm of its peqple.^® 
In line with the United States goveria^nt's withdrawal of its offer, 
the British goverrwent aimminced the cancellation of her offer of $14 ail-
ion. The World Bank loan of $2(K) milliont tfihich had been dependent m the 
prc^osed Anglo-American offer, a®s autonatically withdrawn.^^ 
» * * 
It seems appr^riate at titis point "to analyze the real causes behijnd 
Astern withdrawal of the High Ifem offer and the Iramadiate repurcussions 
of the withdrav«l. 
It was generally agreed that the reasons given by the American 
PepartiBent of State Bulletin July 30, 1956, p. 188. 
19 Joachim Joesten, 30. cit«» p. 129. 
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gevexnfflsnt f©r witiihoidiiiig aid t@ finance the %^tian Da® mxm syperfieial 
mms. There were at least five considersticms that priasrily aiotivs* 
ted Wishii^ton's contreversial d&eisi<m* (i) Dulles was annoyed at Nasser's 
playing a gaa® ©f "eeonoiaic neutralisa,*' by "pitting" testern offers against 
1^<^e of tJie Soviets.^ fiasser iwver abandes^d negotiations with the Soviet 
Wnim to finance the daia even after the V^st had ewnitted itself to iMiild 
the project. {2) President Kasser*s recognition of CoMunist Chirn in JSay 
1^6, caused naicfi irritatlcai to *iiashii^t<tfi» Secretary ftilles called the 
j^cognition "a regrettable aetiOTi.*^! (3) Thei« ms a powerful Ziiariist 
lobby pressing the U.S* C^igress and tiie goverraaent t© jwcansider the ex-
tentien of financial assietanee to Egypt.^ (4) A cotton lobby, spspathe-
tic by a la^e grwip of Souther Congressraen, <^osed Bfeishington's assis­
tance to huild the High Daa. Southern cotton planters were afraid that the 
daa woJld increase Egvpv1.5n c3ttfm-pr«3ucing area, thereby causing new cmb* 
petition lor -the Ifeiited States,^^ (5) Periiaps most ln|>0rtent of all ms 
coneeri^d witJi th® reports received in Ifeshington ttiat ^e Russians mi-e not 
in a positiwi to assist Egypt to fcwild the project. Only four days before 
his wit^idrasfdr^ ©f the offer Dulles announced that "it is i^ossible that 
the Soviets aay aove in.**24 -j^is belief encewraged State Departoent to 
decide that it v?as safe to risk the Egyptian leader's displeasure. 
There vsere other forces at play that helped fjer- ipitate ^feshington's 
20 H.a. Ellis, c|t., p. 192. 
Middle East Journal« "Chrwaology," SufflEser 1956, p. 283. 
H.B, Ellis, CU.,  p. 192 
23 Ibid. 
As quoted in Ma Chester Guardian Weekly. July l^, p. 3. 
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decision. First, the period since the lisstem offer was oade evidenced a 
contimied attack on iestem influeiuie in the Middle East by radio Cairo. 
^Ypt never halted its moral and material sijqf^rt to Wie Algerian nation­
alist rebels in North Africa against France and ttie (tenese revolt in South­
ern Arabia against Britain. 
Secamdly, ig^t cwtimied the ban on the passage of Israel-lw«ind ships 
thr^gh the Suez Canal. Moreover, the arriwl of large quantities of Sov­
iet bloc a»Bs to Egypt ms regarded by the U.S. gcvemmnt as ei^ngering 
the very existence of Israel. The ftepublican platform of August 19©6, de­
clared that •&# effort to secure p«»aee betnesen the Arab nations and the 
Jewish state "was upset by the Soviet bloc sale of arms to Airab countries. 
On Febxuary 24, 1%6, Secretary IMlles, addressing the Senate Foreign Re­
lations CoBfflittee, clarified toe United States positi@n vis-a-vis toe state 
of Is3ra€l. He stated "to.e preservation of toe state of Israel, as I said 
before, is \sliat I regard as 0i» of to« essential goals of United States 
foreign policy."^6 
Thirdly, toe decision to cancel the Anglo-Anerican offer was pez^aps 
prta¥>ted by reports concemir^ increasing Ciwrainist inflitence on toe Cairo 
regise. xh# Western offer Mhich, according to tl«se reports, intended to 
pz^vent Eg^t fn^ leanii^ toward the Swiet orbit did not achiewi tois 
aisi. For exanple, Halter Z. La<|^ur in toe May 1^ issue of Cwaaentary 
pointed €«it toat toe CoBEraunists mxe very influential in toe army, govern­
ment, and press in Egypt. He stated that Nasser "IMS each sonto swerved 
IXf II I. I I.I M I • III. . 
^ 3M Ite Tiaes. August 22, l^, p. 15. 
26 Ibid.. February 26, 1956. 
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fuTth«r his professed ^utralisffi" to « pro-Soviet sentlBent.^ 
Finally, Hassfit's uneoB^roaisii^ stand agsinst foreign alignment, 
partieularly his untiring eaaf^ai^n against any Arab stales* involwsaent in 
th® Baghdad Pact, m$ very antagonizlr^ to iflesteam statesasn. Therefore, 
8mm^ measu3res mst he taken to stqs Nasser frera causii^ a future collapse 
to the Baghdad Pact* Withdrawing tiha offer to tajtild the High Dam mild per» 
haps help tO|:^ls his regisie, thus eliminating •Uie most potential ei^iay to 
pro-*%atem alliance in the area.^ 
* » # 
Nasser received tihie mm of tdie vdthdrawal of Wie S^storn offer v^ile 
he was discussing tli© policy of n^-allgwsent with Indian Prla» Minister 
ffehru and Yugoslav President Tito on the Island of Brioni, Yugoslavia. Hie 
news v«s a blow to Jtesser's prestige, particularly the U.S. government 
charge that the Egyptian econc«y wa^t strorvg to sustain ^^t's 
share in ccwistructing the giant project. 
Nesser's first expressed reaction cam on July 24, l^, lAsn ha vio­
lently attacked the tfnlted States government of creatlr^ false rumors ab(»it 
mskm&s, of -Oie Egyptian eeon^y. He was reported to have statedt 
If rumors In Washington tries to make c«t that th© 
27 seg aijQ Laquer's book, CoEronim and Hationalisa in the Middle 
East of 19^, of M^ich the U,S. Ifeiis aroj Mterld Report. August 1^, re­
printed the passage dealing"ii5^th the Soviet-Egyptian relations. See also 
Ray Alan, •'Cairo-Soviet Gateway Into the Middle East," ^public. Nowfi-
ter, 14, 1955, pp. 6-7. 
^ Keith iPJheelock, clt., pp. 194-7. 
cit.« p. 204| see also K.B. Ellis, clt.« p. 47. 
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Egyptian eeon<»iy is net etr^ en<%igh te wazrant Aaerican 
aid I x^ply t ehol» witli rage itot y(m «tlU r^ver succeed to 
wrcfering us abmt ex exercising yeus tyranny ewr us, because 
we knm mt path of freedm, of bmom, ax of dignity*«•• 
Publish yoNjr c^H^miques in leshington arui tiien censider ^ist 
if these cosnuniques are sincere and due to misinfor^ticm en 
your part tiwt is wfert^nate, but if they are lies desigiwd 
to mislead <^ini©n then Hmt is awch greater aisf^rtime f©r 
the werld PoKwr «#)ich has c(Misti^ted itself iiie ch8Bf>ion of 
llbarty.3® 
Cft the saiae day Soviet Aobassador to Cairo raaffiiiaed his country's 
i«adiness to finance the daa if Uie Egyptian leader asked for it.^^ Ch 
July 26, Masser armoumced to a rally at Alexandria the nationslizaticm of 
the Universal Suez Canal C^any. All profits accruir^ to %ypt froo the 
Canal operati<ms, Nasser said, would used to finance the construction of 
es-Sed el-Ali.32 
mmmmr «mmmk mmmmmm 
The nationalization decree piwided for CMapensation for the share* 
holders and holders of constitwent shares. It declared that shareholders 
"will be c^pensated for the shares and bonds they possess at their value 
estimated at the closing rate m the Paris Bcwrse prior to the date on v#iich 
this law entered into effect." The payment of the ccHspensation wuld be 
made «toen the %yptian governasent took ovar "all the funds and property of 
the nationalized coi^any."^^ 
€n July 27 Britain and tha United States protested J^ypt's nationali-
Manchester OisKiian Wsekly* July 2^, 1^6, p. 2. 
^l<Mle £ast Journals "Chronology," August 1956, p, 4(B. 
on 
U.S« Departaent of State, The Suez Canal Problem, a Documentary 
Publication (Washington, D.C., U.S. Govertwienc Press, 1?©6)7 p. 28. 
The Go^mraent of %ypt! White Paper on the NationalizatiCTi of the 
Suez Maritime Canal Ciynpany (Cairo,"Goverraaent Press 1<^6), p. 4. 
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zatlon of the Canal. Tha British protest statadi 
The Eg^tlan govsrjMnt has proraulgated a law pur­
porting to nationalize the Suez Canal CsMspany as from 
yesterday, July 26, 1956. Har ?4ajesty's government pro­
test against this arbitrary rction, v^ich constitutes a 
serious threat of the freedom of navigation on a asater-
way of vital international iaportance. They reserve all 
their rights and those of United Kingdom nationals as 
sanctioned by the agreements in force. The responsibility 
for the consequence nsist rast entirely upon the Egyptian 
§c^ri«»rit«^ 
The United States deelarddi 
The annoynGwiient by tiie %^tiafi gove^MBant cm July 26 
with respsct t® the seizure ©f l^e installations of the 
Sue? Canal Coi^jany (Harries far-i^aehit^ |j^>lic8ticms. It 
affects the nations «ii®se ectmcsiaiss depend upon pro­
ducts «d)ich iBove tinrcAigh this internati^a I tsaterway ai^ 
the naritim cwintries as wall as the onmers of the Coafsany 
itself. Til© United States goverr^nt is consulting urgently 
with other gownwents cwiceiwied.^^ 
French reaction amn vielent. After an emrgency oeetii^ ©f the 
French Cabinet on July 27, a spokesa^n for the French gonrerrownt declared 
that his country would favor military ©ccupatiffln ©f iiie S^ez Canal if Bri­
tain would jodn France. French Preaier Mollet accused Nasser as a would-
be Hitler.36 
Qit the other hand, tiie S@nriet geverrawnt annwinced w July 29 that 
Egypt's nationalizati^ ©f the Canal Gi«opany was in confomity witti inter-
natiimal law. Ihe govexnnent ple#ed full support to Egypt and appealed 
for noctez^titm of iisstern reaetions.^^ 
Varying reactiens ftm ottier countries were reported. Indian Prim 
^ Middle Eastern Affairs. August-Septeiriber, l%6, pp. 299-3(K3. 
^ &M* 
Jewrrwl. August 16, 1^, p. 397. 
Urn i£S X2£l Xiaes. July 30, 19^, p. 20. 
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Minister liehxu said that Urn natienalization case as a sign of v«eaken-
ing of Euxt^an dminatien of Asia and MicMle East. President Hasser 
3^caived fir« support frasa all Arab gevwjKBsents. President Tito of Yugo­
slavia infozned Itesser ii»at his country wmild stand with Eg^t in the pre­
sent confiiet* Israel ai^ aost NATO aeflabers, hoMSver, c^ruteRs^d Egypt's 
act.^ 
# • * 
Before turning to the mxt phase of the Suez erisis, it is meessary 
to consider tt^ feasibility ©f lashii^ton's decisi®n to withdraw ttte offer 
to help finance tiie Aswan Da®. 
It was generally agreed ̂ e decisi<m was hastily m&de and did not take 
into eonsideiratien a possible violent 3%8Cti(Mn fr®a tte ^j/ptian leader. 
The vrithdrawala in faet» damaged 'Astern, especially AiBeriean^ prestige and 
interest in the Middle East. Moreovar» the tiaii^ ami B»nner of ̂  of^ 
fsr*s withdrawal were particularly Inadvisable. l|te Statesman and Na­
tion (August 4, 19&6) consented that the publication by the State Departoent 
of iiie eancellatitm of the offer 
coincidMI with the end of the ierioni talks....Nasser 
inteipreted decisiem as a deliberate persmial re-
I»jff> tii^d f(xr a meie^nt vtien its effects cfft his om 
position would be greatest. It was inevitable that he 
wtmld attaint stum sort of reposte. 
Vera M. Dean e^qji^ssed her dissatisfactlm wi^ ̂  action of Washington 
as follows* 
....Anytme faailiar with the teaper not only of the 
Egyptians but of other n<m-Westerners #io have lived 
^ IM Middle East Journal. August 1^, p. 397. 
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W0stsm rule eould haw predicted tiiat the sudden 
)ii1^drati8al by the United States^ v^ieh Britain seccmdbdt 
of its offer t© help build ti» High Assan Da» swwild bring 
soiae kind of vigorous retort from Cairo»^^ 
Prime Minister Nehru of India voiced his disaj^roval ©f "Uie United States 
goverwwnt decision. He annaineed cm Ai^st 8i ^ore than the decision# 
tiie way it «as daw h«rt Eg^t's pride ami self-respect and disregarded tiie 
pe^le*s sentiaent.**^® 
Policy Bull»tln> Septeaber 15, 1956, p« 6, 
^0 As quoted in Ibid* 
CHAPra V 
iHE CRISIS or sun 
Today, citizens rights hav» 
Iwen restored to ̂ ir oiffwrs. 
Our righta in the Suez Cami 
have been restored to us after 
100 ̂i^ars* Today* we acbially 
achieve true soirareignty* ^nie 
dignity ai^ true pride. 
Gasal Ab^l Iksser^ 
Zt is believed tSiat the violent reacti<m of the Ifttited Kingdon ar^ 
France to the nationalization of the Canal Cenpany was prated aainly 
by 'tiie anti~&ritish activities of Hasser in the Asrab vK^rld, and to his 
aeti^w assistance to llie anti-French rebels in Algeria.^ If %^t had fol­
lowed pre-«i»8tem policies* ̂ itish and French reaction to the Smz Canal 
nationalij»tiQii night not have been so strong. 
In legal tezfis» the nati^lizati^ of the Canal uns a procee^ral 
aeti<m» tvithin the scvereign right of ̂ e state of Egypt, ^itain recog-
ni3»d Egyptian sovereignty over tfie Suez Canal in the Ai^lo-Bgiflptian treat­
ies of 1936 and 19S4» Article 8 of tlh« 1936 treaty stressed that ̂  Suez 
Canil HAS "an in^ral part of Bgypt«**^ and article S of the 1954 agreeoent 
re{Mated that "the Maritise Canal«»»is an integral part of Bgypt*««"^ 
Not ̂ ly was the Suez Canal exclusively %yptian« but the nati^lized 
^ An excerpt of iiaaser's speech on l^e natimialization of Suez Canal 
Cmmmf* See «ie Departaent of Statet 2ISi Canal Problem - A Docu-
aentary Publieati<Ms« 28-9. 
2 Mi<ifaiX<» East Journal. Autumn 1956, p. 395, 




e(M^>any was Inedxperated under th« l*w of Britain and Fnneo, 
hoMRVort *w#re in no for legaiistie serti^les, they reeolled at #ie 
tJiei^ht of the a»ea Cawil eoning under Egypt's unfettered ecmtrol."^ 
The Iftilted States, Britain, and France x^aeted to the nationalization 
of the Canal by fz«ezing all Egyptian assets within their respective 
countries.^ Then ̂  July 29, 1^, Britain and France urged t}M U.S. gov* 
emaent to Join tiien in devisliif a policy to put ̂  nationalized Suez 
Canal ui^r intemati^l jurisdiction. They also pr^o^d ̂ t Eg^t be 
guaranteed a special positlcm in tiie adninistratlm of -^e canal and a sub­
stantial share in collecting revenues.^ 
€li August 2, t}» l^ree Western Pmmm announced their intention to call 
a conference for the Canal users in Linton in order to c<msider proposals 
for creating an inteinuititRial authority to be responsible for cqperation 
of the Canal* On August 3, Secretary Dulles, In a radio^televlsicn address 
to the Aserican pe^le, called Nasser's **seizure** of the Canal as "an angry 
act ef retaliatitm against fancied grievances*** He maimed ̂ at "to perslt 
'ttiis to go unchallenged wmild be te encourage a breakdoim of intemati^al 
fabric up^ v^ich the security and the well-being ef all peoples depend*" 
Guiles t^en es^ressed ctmfldenee that the f^thcomlng L^on conference 
weuld be able to set up a new machinery for an efficient and acceptable ad-
ainistration of the Canal.^ 
^ Keith Wteelock, |£). cit*« p* ̂ 9* 
^ Mi* 
^ Ilia East Journal, August 19S6, p. 397. 
® Md. 
^ M'l* ind Iforld ttepffirt. August 10, 19^, pp. 38-9. 
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TiieRty*f(»iZ' nations mtm invitod th« e^fd£ttiiet« 
h»ld its iixst sedtii^ on Ai^st 16,^0 Bgypt nM ̂^smm refused to atttnd, 
^t Ali i«Jb7i» Nasser's f@r«ign affairs adviser^ att«i»led th« M«tti{^s a$ 
an Qull«i intr@#i6#d a pr<^osal liiieh called fer the ertatieoi 
9f a Suez Canal Board tntiiieh «^ld providte international supervision of 
Canal <^rati^« By a vote of eighteen in favor and four (India, the Sov­
iet Union, Indoi^sia, and Ceyl«m) against, ̂  prc^osal «ias adqsted.^^ 
The cmi&mmB then decided to s»nd a aissi^ closed of representati^s 
of five iMsriser-states headed by PriMt Minister Beniies of Australiito Egypt 
to present Nasser witti tiie tfecision of th« maiority.l^ 
Meantf^ile, stateiRents by British and Frenoh high autiiorities nade it 
clear that tiie two nations were dbtereined to pjwswnt Sgypt fr« exeoutir^ 
its deo:raes of i^e nationalizatieiM of ̂ e eanal. PrSioe Minister Sdea of 
Baritain liaolared, "the British Govextiaent is dbtersiimd that <aur essential 
interests in ̂ is area mist be safefuarded, if necessary by ailitary aeti^, 
and that iiie imdfUl preparatic»is aust be mete* Failure to ke^ the canal 
inteasaticHTial would Inevitably lead to the loss of msi by one of our inter­
ests and assets in the Middle East, and even if Her Majesty^s (kmxment 
The countries Invited to attewJ ttie 6<mferenoe weret Pakistan, 
H^nvay, Sweden, Port»i^al, Australia, Canada, Soviet Uai^, tlui United 
States, Britain, France, In^ia, Scidt^sia, l^n, Ceylon, Mgfptt Oreece, 
Siast CSetnany, Japan, Dera^rk, Hthiepia, I^w iealafHl, tiu^ey, %}ain, and 
Italy. 2^ Times Waeklv Review. Ai^ust 13, IS©6, p, 56, 
R.I.I.A,, clt.. p. 
Greece refused to participa'te in tiie C^ferenee because it was tiien 
^ food teros with ̂ ypt, «^ich sui^orted Gntek claim to Cvp»is* 
la Ibid. 
Herbert Feis, •Suez Scenarios A tanentable Tale,* ForeSan Affairs. 
July I960, p. 602. 
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ha<4 t© aet ttlmm thay ewild not $t«^ »h®rt &f usli^ f^trce to pio"toct their 
p©8iti#n."^^ Pineau, French Fox«ign Ministtz-f (foeiated ^at Fsrance would 
not j^n^tnee the uXtisate use of military actiflm if neeeasary to empal 
ita$s9T to abide by the London e^ferenee deeieion to put Hut caml undbr 
internati<»ial control.^® In the iwantlne Anglo-Freneh foroea Isiild-t^ in 
tite ttodil^rranean area be§m, ai^ France sent trocps to Cyprus* 
!lisser refused the pr^osal* eallii^ it a imasure infringing 
^yptian sovereignty* He amaffiraed Bgiypt*^s willif^ness to guarantee pass-
afe thrcui^h tiite Canal without discriainati^a develop Canal for ex­
panded ̂ ^re use* iipose Just ami equitable tolls* and maintain te^nieal 
efficiency* In a pmm con^renee on Septei^r 2, tifte Egyptian lea^r 
stated! 
late will accept any soluticHft ̂ t d«W8 not affect our 
sovereignty* lfite;»iational control n^ld affect mir sove­
reignty* It is a satter of Interpretation, I knitm* but we 
int#]^ret inte»ntti^l ccntrol to be a fo»i of colleetive 
colonialisa* the ̂ ez Car»l is ̂ ypt^s ai^ the cospany 
ttiat runs it is Egyptian* li> are willing to sign any agree-
aent <toRaii^d by countries using canal that weuld guarantee 
firoe navigation Utrou^h ih9 caml*^^ 
the Western Big Ihree were annoyed by Bgypt's refusal of t^e Lond^ 
pr^osal* &it idiile ^e ̂riean positie*^ still favored i^aceful settleisent 
through ̂ otiati<Mis» i^itain and France wsre detemined to iiE^pose interna­
tional control of the Canal* by force if necessary* On Septei^r 11* i^t-
ish Priffie Minister Eden and French Fresier Mollet isstwd a joint eonaiinlque 
in Londtm «l)ieh declaring t 
14 J^*, pp. 599^600. 
Ibid*, p. 601. 
R*I*I*A** JJgl* P* 205* 
As <|uoted in Middle Eastern Affairs. Noveii^r, 1%6, p. 414* 
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• mtvml @f Psdsldent Nasset to mifetiate on ̂ is 
basis the l^^on tmiemne^ pr^osti eseated a very grave 
situaticMn.*.* The Ministers <lisi»issed ^e Ittr^er^imasures 
to be taken ai^ reached foil agrement iq>en theai*^® 
Gb Septei^r 12, '^e two heads of fovermmntt sent a letter to the United 
{iatiiwis Seeyority Cwneil deelarii^ that letter's »ifusal to tiie eighteeiv-
m%lm prt^sal for internationalizati^ of ̂ e Sues Canal "is an a§graira* 
tii^ of t}» si^titm* «hieh» if all«nNed to e^tiime, would eonstitute a 
manifest danger to peace ami i^eurity.^i^ On tJie sane day, Iden told the 
Hmise of ComuHis that Misteni B|^ Tha»ie had decided to set a 
Canal Users' Aesoeiatim (SCUA) which m^ld be autii^i^d to act e«i behalf 
of the eaml users. Bg^t w^ld reeeii^ pa-pMint for pswiding facilities 
to the mw oi^anization* Eden tiamed if igi^t reused to eo-qperate in 
iqpleaentin§ the mm plan, his g«vesi^nt and o-^er nsi^rs of the SCUA 
would be free te take any necessary measures.^ Secretary Dulles, on 
Septei^r 13, hastened to announce that although his goveriment strot^ly 
supported the new associatimi, the ̂ ited Statas was not prepared to *'shodt 
its way" through the canal.2i 
Invitati^ were sent to the eifhtwen nati^ms that supported tlie pre­
vise Umdoit conference pr^osal for a se6<»y ccmference te held 
on Septei^r 19* The iHixpose of the i»w conference nas to pnit the SCIM pro* 
posal into action. On Septenber 15, the U.S.S.B. govexfusent amounced its 
€^positic«ii to the SCUA. It described tba association as a "great 
^ For the text of ̂ e coomnique, see ibid., pp. 396*7. 
United nations, Sewirity Council. Official Recordst Docuaent S/3645, 
20 |h£ York Times. September 13, 1956, p. 1. 
Ibid.. Septeuiber 14, 1996, p. 1. 
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P70vo6«tlon" against %yptian sowitd^nty* It eauti^nad that any amtd 
attack against Igi^t to seize the eanal «^ld eause i^zepaxable dai^e to 
the eanal inetallati^e arul would lead to the destzittOti<H^ of oil fields and 
pipelirws in the Arab wofld.^ 
Seci^etairy Dulles was ih« fiirst to address the l&^Mtim L^on eon-
fezenoe osi Seplw^r 19« outlined a six-point plan for the 
(l^ the pwsent 18-nation assooiati<»[i should ccmtiiuiet (2) ttie assoeiati^ 
should tai»i the joint l8-nati<m prcfjosal of the first eonfez^noe as a basis 
for negotiati^ witii Sgypti (3) it sh^ld haw a ̂ 11 ̂x«ting s^ff ready 
to assist ships thro^^h tt» oanal{ (4) it shsitld have a i^ll govei«iing 
board to keep aei^rs infi^effied of dewlopfflentsi (5) it should have "a lat­
est w«»c4cing fund"i and its aeabership would involve no obligation to 
take enf^roeaent aetion against Egypt in ^ latter reifesed to co-
eperate with the ^Vlk» All smaberst it was heped, wmild **voluntarily take 
suoh aotifm with respect to ̂ eir ships and tiie payment of eanal ̂ es as 
vrauld faoilita^ tlie work of the associati^ ai^ build up its prestige and 
authority, a#^ cflwsequently its ability to serve.*23 
% not obligating meters of the assoeiaticm to take a collective act­
ion in the event of Egypt's :rafusal of tiie new piraposal—in o^r w^s, by 
leaving to the members ̂ e right to decide ir^pendently their respective 
policy—it mi clear that the SCXJA c<»ild not make ouch success* Moreover, 
Nasser refused to allow the pr^osed association to ihincticn in the eanal 
area. After being cmivljiced tiiat Bgypt was not ready to alter its 
22 Ibid.. Septe«ber 16, l^, p. 3. 
23 For the text of the state«ent, see Mi^le Easteari Affairs. 
Hoveffiber 1?^^, pp. 397-9. 
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detoznination to naturalise th» canal, the British at^ Franee took ano^r 
asasuxe* They ^tsuattod Wastei^ pilots sexving the IMW Egyptian Suez Oinal 
Mitiiority to resign, h^ing to inpede traffie of the canal and thus to prow 
Bfypt's nanageesnt of total failure.^ Egypt, however, proved her oo®-
petenee to run the c&ml dtospi-te the resignatioi\ of abt^t a hundred noiv-
Ig^tian pilots* The 0,S.S»R. |jn»»dla^ly provided Egypt with fifteen pilots* 
Tw3 hundred more a^lieations mxe i^eeived by the Egyptian gon^rfuaent from 
pilots of Aaerican, West (^raan, and other natlimalities seekir^ to replaee 
those jsfco resSiimd.^ 
All tiwse atteai^ts against Egypt failed* The canal was uiHler Egyptian 
control, and the mm authority was operating efficiently. Confronted vdtti 
^is fact» ISas-tem Powers made new TOves. Britain and F^ince called for a 
meeting of the United Natiws Security Council # With a unaniaais voi» of 
its fflsffibers tiie Ceuncil on October 13, 1^ passed a resolution eabcMlying 
l^ie following principles! (l) firae and open twinsit through th« Suez Canal 
without discrifflination, overt or covert — be it political or tedmicalj 
(2) respect for the sovereignty of Egypt} (3) the insulation of the (^ra­
tion of the canal frm the politics of any country} (4) the allocatimi of a 
fair pr^^orti^ of the ̂ es to developing the canal} (5) the fixation of 
tolls and charges by agreenent between Eg^t and the users} and (6) disfMJtes 
between the aie« Canal Ceffif>any and tJie Egyptian goverwnent shcAild be set­
tled by arbitratijm*^ 
The ieeisicm of ̂ e Security Ct^inoil e)f>ressed tiie general l«lief that 
^ Joachiffi Jeesten» oit*, p* ISd, 
^ BM»» PP* 
^ Iteited Naticms* Security Cwincil, Official atoord* 743 Beetir^. 
Egyptf then not beii^ a msmber of tiie Security Couneil, suq^rted 
these six principles* 
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Biypt*s of th« Sues Canal Ccnpany did not affoet the stai^e 
of canal as a vital ifiteniati^uil wmteTway* Traffic ̂ rou^h eanal 
eontiiMied to operate ne«ffially.^ Ships of all natioiMlitiest even two of 
Israel's* passed withmit incident*^ igypt evsn allewed passage of ships 
Kfliieh insisted on paying dNws to the esqptrqpriated ©aaapany in Paris.29 The 
§er»ral belief was liiat the six priiieiples of IJie Security Council were an 
expressim of the conciliatory a^od of ̂ e partios involved* Frasident 
HistnhOdwir ^teribed tiie dlscussimis of the C«iincil as i^st gratifying 
Egyptian F^l^n Minister Mc^dimid Fawzi expressed his gmewmamVa inten­
tion to c«®ply »rtth tha new <laci$i<»is of ttie Security Council. 
The hope tiiat a ftaal peacoflil solutitm te the aiez questiwn seeTOd 
noif «d.^in reach* ifhad not actually been a^iewd, wis so<m shattered by 
a suceessiOR of unfortunate e^nts. The Security Cmmcil's qpiiet deliber-
ation appeared to be the ealii»»ss preceding a hurricaiw. 
^itish and French leaders suddenly annminatd their disapproval of the 
six principles endorsed by the United Mations.^^ October 16, ̂ e Brit­
ish Priiie Minister and Foreign Secretary conferred with their French eminter-
parts in Paris* €l>servers believed that at this OMeting plans were drawn 
to invade Egypt*^^ On October 16, Dulles again reaffirswd the United States* 
intention of seeking a peaceful settleiMint to the Suez issws. He amiouni^d 
M.E. Ellis, ̂ * eit*« p* 49| see also, ^* cit., p» 
28 Ktitti %3Mteloek, p* 240. 
R.I»X»A*, <HP* cit* 
30 
Joachiffl Joesten, |£. £it*> p* 152. 
Keitii Nheelock, cit** pp. 240-1* 
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his position to the xesosrt to nilltary ection and pledged his eounts'y's 
support to vietlBs of aggression.®^ 
In the fiMantiaie, on Oetobear news of quiet Israeli axmy Bobilizati^ 
lealmd to the eutside world*^ On the saoe day. President Eisenhower issued 
a state®int referrii^ t® reports of Israel's "heavy i^bilizati^a of its a*»-
ed forces." He said he t^d learned that "the Isiraell oobilixatim has eon* 
tii%M»d and has beeoi»» alsost coiqplete, with eense(|uent st^age of sany 
civil activities." The President addbd tinat he had sent tK» oessages to 
Israeli frirae Minister £:tivid Ben^Caurion urging Mm to exercise every pos­
sible preeautl(»i to avoid an ̂ tbreak of war thez«. Eisenhower also dis­
patched sinilar nessages of c^icern to neighborii^ Arab statesOn Oet-
^r 29, Israel launched a general attack against Bgyptian ailitary positions 
alfi«^ the Eg^tian-I$:iraeli fr^tier, ai^ Israeli paratroopers landed iteep 
in Egyptian territory. The first Israeli mr eorawnique stated 13iat her 
invasion's object was to 8ei»» the Suez Canal.^^ 
^n and Mollet^ after a hurried sseeiili^ in L^dw OctolMir 29, 
issued a Joint ulti^tm callirmi m Bgj^t and Israel to halt fire witiiin 
twelve hwirs and to withdraw their ailitary fori^s to a distant^ of ten 
ffilles frfflta -ttie Suez Canal so that navigatlim thr««gh the Canal would not 
be obstructed. Egypt was called to peiaAt Ai^lo-French forces to 
occupy Port Said, Issiallia, and Sues city. Bgi^t was warned ^at failure 
to accept the texms of tiie ultlnatun wenjld "necessitate Anglo-French 
 ̂2E SlI Times. October 17, 1956, p. 8. 
^ 3M Middle East Journal. Winter 1^7, p. 79. 
M SSS XBSk IMl* Oetober 29, 1956, p. 1. 
Ibid.. October 30, 1956, p. 4. 
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intervention in such strer^th as necessary to secure ctM^liancs."^^ The 
0,S» govermi^nt protested to Britain and France against their demand 
caXlii^ it "the »ost bmtal ultifflat%un in atodkim history.**^® It declared 
that it was prepared to stqp all econosiie aid to Israel until ̂ at state 
witiidrew its troe^s fxm Egyptian soil.^^ The Unitod States called for an 
iMMidiate sessi^ of Seeurlty C^ncil and circulated to the Cimcil 
ffiei^rs a letter accusing Israel of coimitting aggressive act against 
Eg^tian territory.'^® 
Tim Se^rity Council on Octobtr 30. Britain and France vetoed first 
an Aiaericsn draft resolutiim calling m Israel to wi^draw her forces be* 
hii%d the true« line and mi other states to refrain fr^ using or l^reatan-
ii^ fmm in the area* Their second veto was exercised against a Soviet 
resoluticm of a sijiilar purpose On the second dNiy Britain and France 
voted, again opposing the rest of the C<mncil*s netibersf against calling 
a s]^cial session of the Gemral Asseably.^^ ISeanwiiiile tahen the l2-h(»ir 
altiteati» •jqpired id13» Egypt's reftisal to allow Anglo-French occupation, 
British bibbers attacked nilitary targets in Eg^t.^^ 
I^e special $essi«»i of the Assefflbly mt m itoimBber 1| and on 
Noveariber 2, it called on Israel to withdiraw behind the amistice lints, and 
Mi*» October 30, 1956, p. 4, 
^ Ibid., October 31, p, 1. 
Ibid. 
M*» Yearbook 2| ̂  United Hationf. 19S6, p. 25. 
Ha &S BiSI» Oetober 31, p. 1. 
Ibid., Moveraber I, p. 1. 
M Mi«idle Sast Journal. Winter 1957, p. 67. 
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m all partita to eaasa fira. Tha rasolutimi did not brand any party as 
an afgreasor.'^ When Britain ami Francs s^fiaaed to eooply, the AssaM>ly ss-
aolved en KowsO^r 3i (l) that tiie Saeratary-Qanaral should within ffarty-
aight hotirs subnit plana lor an aottrganoy Unitad Haticma police foreef 
(2) ill^t the eeage<-fir« rtaoluti^ shcmld be ooiBpliad «d.th by all parties 
within twelve hwra#^® 
tiiw liait escpired* ̂ y Bgypt had aeoepted the ̂ solution* 
Ismel had asked for farther olarifieation fxm tiw Seeretary-^neral on 
^ resoltiti^t an attei^t to delay her eoKplianoe* ^itain and Franee did 
not reply* but l^eir paraohutists were landing m Port Said early Monday, 
Heveaber 5,^^ Iftiile the ̂ eretary^neral was preparing for the United 
Hatl€»is police f«eree late M^rtday, he rei^ived Israelis agreecient to a 
oease«fliro* the note said nothing about its ndthdrawal to axsistice 
47 
lim or ab«K«t the ̂ ted Nations polioe foree* On November 6, tiie t«^ 
Western Powers infoimd Urn As^ffibly of their deeisicm to eease-fire at 
Bidnight,^ 
Before Britain and France annixinoed their decision to eease fii«, 
Soviet Preaier Bulganin issued a warning to tite tm Gentries and Israel 
that they sh^ld stef:> titeir '*aggresslcsi*' against Egypt's sovereignty within 
twelve h^rs* The Soviet yltisatan rwninded ̂ e three countries that titere 
^ y*arbook £f the ttraited Nations > 1956 resolution 997 (ES-I), 
p. 28* 
^ Ibid., resolution 999 (ES-I), p. 29. 
Be Middlf MSl iSEBl. «i«ter 1957, p. 68. 
MM BSIS3E 2121IS^ - 1956, p. 30. 
Bt Ms Tines. November 7, 1956, p. 1. 
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tNiBZ* sta'tos "that possess all kinds of modem destjmotive weap@as" n^ieh 
"eoiild at the psesent tias, instead of sending naval ®r ti* fojrees to ttw 
sh^s" of ̂ itain, Fx^nce* and Israel, "use other sieans sueh as roeket 
meapem."^® Bulganin ejqpnssed Soviet ̂ texcainatim "to o^sh ti» afgres-
s«W8 by the use of force and to restore peaee.*®® Ti» Soviet Union, in the 
mantioe proposed m Kovesyber 6» a joint aetitsi vAUi tihe United States* 
with l^e lAiited !teti^s sanetievi, to use anaed forces of the two states if 
there ms no eease*fire in Egypt Md'tiiin twelve Ihe United States 
rejeeted the Soviet proposal as "unthinkable."®^ 
Since ̂ e begiiming of hostilities« the Arab world had shown stror^ 
solidarity with Sgypt* The anti-invaders* :»aetl^ lamdiately after tiie 
mT had begun dealing heavy blows at the Middle Bastem interests of Brit­
ain and France. Ihe Iraq Bstroleoa C^Bap«ny*s p^lines across Syria were 
blonsi up{ disojrtters flaaied up in Kuwait* BahraiJi and Qatar (the latter two 
were Aiwb oil pto<fcicing territories under British protection Saudi 
Arabia or^red tin Arabla-Aaejrlcan CH.1 C'oapany (AE^O) not to provide 
Britain and France wi^ oil.^ Ihe Peking of the Arab world giv«n to Bgypt 
was described by jroaehin Joesten as follomt 
Iftat had not been anticipated was that the 
entire Arab World* with rare unanlnlty* would leap 




^ Joaehln Joesten, clt.. pp. 160-1* 
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ovartorow of Nasstx'? By tiw Iseuaneo of toeir ultiaa^ of Oetoboir 30» 
1956, ̂ tain and Franoa pyesantad Egypt with two alta^mativasi Bgyptian 
6W»ant to Anglo»Fveneh oeetq>ati^ of ttia Canal« ot a foreifola intorventiim 
of two P««Mi78. Fvaitea and Britain, hcHWYort did not dtaand tha ZsYaalis to 
go baek to thtir OI«R iteirritoiry* hut oonsantad to toa Istaali troepa baing 
statiemad tan alias aast of toe oanal. These is season to believe toat toe 
invasion ms psesaeditatod by Issael, Fsan^t and toe United Kingdom, this 
belief was shased by SOM U*S; psess* On Meysmbes 4, 1956 T^ Hgv Yoslc 
Tiaes stated Hueh of tht evi^nee toat has beei* bsonght os hinted at toe 
proof of Anglo-Fseneh-Zssaeli eollusim dbsived fstm toings seen and whis-
i:NBsed in Tel Aviv in toe easly da^ of toe eaiqsaSgn.*' Time (Novei^s 12, 
1^) was »»e blimt in pointing out a possible psios assangeaent among toe 
thne c€i«itsies of the $eh«M to invade Egypt i 
Israel's F49«el^n Ministry talked of "toe iin-
esqpeetad intervention of Britain and Franee." 
Britain's Foreign Secretary Selwyn iloyd protested 
*Ihere was no prior words between us." Despite 
their words, toere was plenty of evidenoe to shew 
toat to* two attacks ware plam^sd in eollusi^n 
("e^^stration" was the Frenito wc^d for it)* In 
tois 6(»ispix«ey, France was the instigator, ̂ itain 
a belaitod partoer, and Israel toe willing trigger* 
* * • 
It was an unquestionable fact toat the Anglo»Frenoh»I^eli invasion 
of %^t ended in diasal failure* Gn toe dooastie aiMl intesmational scenes, 
Kasser scored a political victory, whito pexhaps eould never have been 
achieved witoout toe tripartite intervantim in Bg^t* world ̂ inim as 
e}q:>ressed at the Ibiited Nations rostrtm believed Egypt to be a victim of 
aggressicm and rallied strongly behind her* The Ijnvaders wire condewied 
for toeir pursuance of toe outdated "gun-boat diplomacy*" Except for 
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»n<l m &m li«Nl» unA imt @f Sxah st«t»s»̂  m th« othtr. had 
eausad tha nost aayisua pelitiaal aiMi mmm&» oriais IA mwUm l̂ itapa 
siiHE* W«tld Wair XX* €ti Jaî ty 2» 19S7« ahsrofatid Sm« Canal 
Agm«iant #1 X9i4» aakiai ̂  absrofatlon xvttitaitiva to Oetî sr 31» XSId6, 
tiaa of tha fixst aiar tald m Fort Sald*̂  7̂  figyptian 
mmm aliî tad tha last smoiant of Irtish inlXuen̂  In Bĝ t* 
itian the CanaX laa x«i|Miiiadi grttain and ftaaea* laekins any othas 
iw«itt»ia9 paawlt̂  tliaix î lps pay t̂ la to fox' ̂  asa of ̂  
aanal* Hiila dIpXmatie x«latî s l>atNaaii Btitaifi aiwl î î t wota 3iN»st«wd 
In Daî n̂ y 1999 afta» a sattlMniiit had haan vaaebid batman igypt ami tiia 
natliKMiliaid Canal aarliax' in ̂  yaat» tha Alfoxian stxtt̂ la 
fm pxavcmtid liia laî um to n̂ emal xalations hatman Bgypt aiy 
fiai»fia tBiMl tha aatly fMirt of Urn f9»s lf6a« 
1h« aliainatî  of Angtlô fiaâ  inllMnai in Egypt and nttdi of 
ifiddla Hat lalt tha finitad to pliy a Xazgair sola in iim affaiî s of 
aî « Umtwmt ̂  OnitiHl States |H»alti«s ik̂  atxanĝ nad* 
Hisr imo«»̂ iMpBising sttffedl aga:̂ t Anflo-Fminĉ Xsiniali aî taaeion and har 
imsiiaiivingi adhasNpmoa to Initad Miti«na* m pla^ IMIX 
in a "SII Q̂M:̂  lâ l positim" in Hia Aimh «ind«̂  MGomovay* kmtiea had 
navat pxavtensly haan inŷ vadln Kldd:Mi itat ooloaial aotivitlas* At tiia 
and of tha Ŝ az hoatilitiaa î at pâ la of tha ataa had av«a fosgottan tiiat 
tha Iftiitad Statas* ndtî draml of fiigh Aaima Qm offâ r wis an aî nt 
 ̂ Syria* Saudi Axthia» and ¥a«in l̂ iHca off folatî  nit̂  
botili Qm»% Birltain and Firanoii Xtâ  and Jotiten aavatad salatiwta «dlth 
ftmm only* 
® SaiSSss aaMx» •?«»*•** a. iw, p. 3* 
 ̂ &! Stataaaan and tft̂ tlon* Jl̂ nnaTy 5, 1957* p. 9* 
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of •emmiie dtditaiad to tha siî teatfieo of 
iwttî l ifidtpti»i«itM. 
It would, in tlio toosmd pjuioot tû otixt tho 
EmmUm to uradtxttieo in tiio •mm vogiim of 
niUtoty tstistanet aiMi eo«po»ti<m idlî  tny natiflm mt 
§wmxp of i»ti«ns irtiiĉ  dtsitos î oh tid* 
It iie»idi In iih» IMxd plt6o» t«tbotiiw sueh 
tssistti«Ni %mi oooposttioa to inoJUidlt Hit oiployaont of 
ii3m mwm4 imm* 6i ̂  ̂tod Stales to mmm ami pto-
toet tdie 1»t3rit«rial intogrlty SIMI ̂ Utieal. indtptî noo 
of stî  nations xtqpwstliig S«N̂  aid t§ainst mmH awtd 
aî xossien ftoii any nati«fi eontrollod lay intoaoatiiNMiJL 
oeaNiiniMi*.**̂ !!̂  aiî iHrity weaid luit oxtyeistd osMwpt 
at tlui ̂ six« of tlio natic»i attaolctd.*® 
Qne-half billion dollats was doŝ natod to strong t̂ n tht a»ia afainst tho 
liixoat of Seviot "sobvotsieat*" as dlstinot fren tlw î tJdght aŝ xossion 
liiieh al(̂  was to bo eivottd undtt ike Ooeî int*^^ 
It was gononlly boliovod l̂ at saoooss of Eisô owir Ê ootxino 
Mould to a §foat oxtont dofstnd on tN i«if»«f»o of oouatarlAs of Urn Aartb 
H&ddlo Qist*̂  ̂ Egypt was f3io fivst eoiintanr srsftiso any assooiation id'tii 
it«̂  Its pxoss attaekod It as btins ano'̂ r Nestsm atteiq>t to intoriNxo 
in tl» intoxnal affairs of the knh eouatvios*̂  As a xoiwilt of Bgypt*s 
attilsidt tOMSd ttm doetsrint* all Imt tluroo Aswb govoamants—liati, Lobammt 
mi Jorcton—miNsod or at least did not amouneo tlwit aeoiqpitan̂  of 
Affairs* Fotamaty 19®7, pp. 62-8. 
11 Joachim Joesten, clt.« p. 172. 
12 ôhR C. CaMpbell, "Ftsai Sootrlno to Poliey in tho Middlo Bastt* 
Foftian Affaiifs. April 19S7. 
13 Iho Piiblio Affairs Î titato, S«y?,l9PWat |h 
poaco (Rashingtcm, D.C., n.d.)» p. 157. 
Ibid., p. 157. 
n 
Gf ̂  d«6tiri»i tmi emUm94 attains iqp«ii 
Nist«i»i ii«%i«is 6iii8*d %& Hllm • ̂ton^hss policy t&mwi l̂ 9mw*9 
Wtmt$ th* tl.S« ̂ ^laatnt slight to isolate fvm ̂  lOst of 
the Ax«l» (ki itojNSh 12, IWI, ̂«me P. ii(^ar<tSf a hl^h-midcing Stiito 
Dtpaxtfiifit tffieial» wis sent to tho Middlo Sist to totoi^sonpt ^ Bison* 
hOMjr Ofl«t»iBO im MOk ^9itie9 W^fpUMn capital ws 
i^t iiielodad if} his ttissim*^^ tm ftihmmxf lWf$ Kias Satt4 daxing his 
visit to imTim ai^^Kwoo^ his si^i^pwt (li«t a^ot aoooptsnoo) of tho dootriiMP 
AftotiMi? s^iva by tha fmwimu fowotiMaiit daaigm# to shew its disfai^ to* 
mwi liiS80x> mas Wishljigteo's afXoimtAt to |»te tilia adiitai^ of 
^ BaflMiad Paet.^^ 
MsanmliilOt tiis lisaidiowe? I^tirina mas xointazpfetad* Ihe taxm, 
'^amad a|^x«ssi<m* mn no leagox to ttftr to only a dizoot attack of m9 
natiMi Inr aaotlMirf but also to atteiqpts to mmHiixm i:^o»WB8tasn Aaeab §m» 
eamatRts 3^to»»il xvvolts «ith outsido aaaistanoo* Tim tai» "any 
eountxy 6<»itrollad by intoxnational Conw«tis«'* MS mm to aoan a natiMi 
with striMig tias i&Ui tha iM o^«r woor^* B9yf>t aiui Sy»ia» 
Iho dootrim Msa appliad for i3ia first in J^idan «iwyt King Ikis-
sain's diwiesal of tha pxo-Kissoy Amb nationalist govomMnt of Pfwtiier 
Kaith IftMMiloek, cit*. p« 
Ult Sast Jotttnal. "Chywiology," Spring lf57, p. I6f. 
In osdar not to antaf^lM Nassoar* Washington has xoi^inod fxo« 
baooi^ a full naalsor of tlw Baghdad Pact. Joining tha ailitaxy eoMsittae 
of #ui paet aada ̂ a lAriiitod Statos in all but in lagal t«x»s a i^ll 
paaHdeipant in tha pact* 
2® John W. %>iniar, Awagjean Foyoign Policy Sineo Itocld Wtr 11, (New 
Yotki Frodariok A. Praogan mi)» p. m. 
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^Utinin tialmlsi «aiis«<l a ftnml 8triie» aiMi lavg* anti-Hnstaln and anti* 
AMiriean ̂ hmcMiattatioBs in najejr Je^nian eitias. King AtsMin a«<Mia«4 
iUiilNixiiati(»ial CcNHKmiui as bting zaspensibl* fm tfet OPisis* On Apx>il 24, 
1957* th« Starts aj^xossad its e<»ioafii tm tiit aitanatian ai^ dis-
pat^<i th# Si3(^ flaat to fanb Hiditanmaaafi shdtas*^ 
llissat aeoisâ  th« tftiiteii Statas of baini  ̂mm> to oust an 
iatOAsoly nationalistie JcHiilaiiiaii fovoxnatat, of stteiiating maag Labanost 
Chiristiaiis hostility towaird %)̂ t« aiul of attô itlî  to fiwoxthxmr 
Syjrian goyozfnwtit.̂  Ha8aiz>> hcNMvax, 9psm%m$ to oadtvetaAfi ̂  llbitod 
Statoe' €mmm wx tiio Syrian toflaa and its possiblo falling into Cm-
nmist hands. His obioetiwi to ̂  ll*S* stand m Syxia ins t»std m his 
offinviotien ̂ t only a policy st̂ r̂tad by Wm Airab w»rld ooHld sayo Syî  
fwm h»:e dilMBM. 
Dui ̂ iriean govoztimint 8»«Md ̂ toz«in»d to isolato Kassat fwm tha 
cost of ̂  fmh noxld aî  also to oxotoiso oê oMie pxossim m his mglaMi* 
St c<intinaad its to ̂  antî iiasMX Amb govofnnonts of 
Labanoii» and Ĵ rdan*̂  Iho Bgyptiait Uaday oiqpteasod his f̂ inian sogaxding 
UHitod Statas* latost aetivitios agtlnat hi». Ha doolatodi 
Hit intoxosts of Egypt lit idtli gMd xolatians 
with tlw Iftiitod StatMts. Bat in axo not xoady if oux 
sovoxoignty is afjNetod**«.TNixo is a pxosnixo to 
l̂aî  Ottv lina of policy and to tSo it to tha 
United Stâ s* thaxo axo Aaoxioan aetiyitios to 
htmdlliate us* Iho tl,S« is txî Uig to isolai» 
It is aî lying aeoniaie pxossiixos* Ihon thaxo la 
 ̂Joaohitt Joost»n> SB,* £ll*» P* 
 ̂H,B, illisa eit»» p« &1« 
23 HM., pp. 50-3. 
-m 
AaerioiR pxepag«nd«.^ 
Tht Btzgtr of Syria and Bgypt under President l^eser's leadership in 
February 19^« did not introdhiee any basio ohange In the relations betMten 
the United States and ̂ e newly fcomd Iftiited Arab ̂ epublie*^ Washingtw 
rather weleeoed tlw aewe because it rtsoMd Syria iwm a possible Coonunist 
eoiiHF>* Oullos pointed out that ̂ e nerfor was a sign that ̂ e two Ofluntries 
were detendned to airoid being taken over by international CoBsunisn.^ 
&i tihe mamx of l^» ano^er orisis oeeured in the Arab Middle East. 
On July 14* a gtmp of natioflalist officers« led by l^igadier General Abdul 
Karia KassMi* overthrew the prooWastem Iraqi i^nar^ical r<^ia» of King 
Feisal*^ Ihi new Iraqi regiae did not teediat»ly withdraw froa the 
Baghdad Paetf but such a mm was believed inevitable, the revolutiwi in 
effect cancelled £raq*s nenbership in the alliance* thus tiie Arab nmber 
mpm idii^  pact had pivoted was no longer a stabilizing f<»ree* Ihe 
tMited Amb Roj^blic hailed the revolution as a great victory i&t Arab 
^ 2l3& Me*«w»el^. Hwember 25, 1957# p. 57. 
^ Kei^ Mheelodc described the BWiger of Bgypt and Syria as folloiffi t 
**In I956t Just before the nationalizati<m of the Svmz Canal Conpany, plan­
ning for a close Egypto»Syrian political alliance had reached an advanced 
stagof although a «iries of crises interveiMd, by NomMter* l%7, a Joint 
session of the Egyptian ai^ Syrian Parliaaentc had unaniflMHisly ajf^rowtd a 
fedtarral uni^ between the two counMes. Two aim^s later f^ese plans 
af^roai^d fruition# But in Jamuryt l^» the fedteraticn id^ was drop* 
pod in of a nore coaprehensim aerger. According to I^sident Hasser* 
Syrian political leaders caae to ae sayii^ everytiiing was a atss. I aet 
wiHi all except Coanunlsts. They told ae» *Qnly you can save us. 
Liqtiidato our parties and join us Bg^t«* OU»r reports suggested that 
tim sudden decisl<m for a full union was proapted by the alarali^ growth 
of Coanunist influence In Syria* These n^ports se«Hed to be boriM out 
idien« m February I# Nasser established hlaself as absolute ruler over 
the IMited Arab Bepublic (Bgypt and Syria) and provision was aade for a 
single political party—the Iteti^l IMlim.** c||*, p. 258. 
26 H.B. Ellis, 2£. p. 53. 
^ S» Has ISâ  Tiaes. July 15, 1958, p. 1. 
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Sm tdOt Hit ftmnts In Itaq h«d • exitieal •lltet* Jyist a 
littlt JMiss liw M»1^s btlost ̂  1««0. x«V9l.iati<Mit on l^bxttary i7» 
tilt p3E>o*Wastt3mt goraxs^Htot el King H^sstln tnttirtd lAto a ltdt»tti<m 
wilii atattixt was dttlgnttf Uf s^ngthtn Kitsttia's psttitloe amsiag 
his pt^ltt stM tl liiea w»t« |»£o»Nit£ty Piti«stijiiaii hw&h »tfug«t8« TNi 
8ii^ti«a alttt thA Ijfaili xtveltttioi nas Hacdly luipfiy iim th« yeong king* 
On ISt ItlMuiQii ^t MU^nshmmw D^trlm aiMt asletii tht 
iaittd Statts fm ailitaty 8ti|^03rt» Jttdan aU# ztqotsttd Barltith Bilitaxy 
aiil.^ Thi§ Statts stnt 14,^ trn^s inte Ijtiau^m* t» Jtfdaa, Bari-
talA loMdlattly atut jMizatT^t tt pirettet Kiag }taas«in*s M 
his atssagt to Congitss m ii, Mr* iiswihowtr pointtd mt ̂ t his 
iteeisi^ to stud kmxUm tto&ps was aa Itptzativt st»p il tlit in^iiMiAdeiieft 
mi ia^jrity #1 yibaa<^ «if te bt pztstJmNI. Iht Mtssagt staltd thatt 
Uiiitid Statta Itttts ajrt kiting stnt to i«haa«i to 
pTOttct AMxieaa liwas ai^ by tlwit pstttiMso to 
atoist ̂  ̂rnmmmmt of Itkaaai in ̂  pxtsoxvati«H% 
of Ithaiioa's ttsxit^rial iat^x^ity ai^ indtpti^aet, 
havt htm 40mm4 idtai li» ISm Statos 
iMtional inttsNists and «iotld {itaet»»#«lffii shasw with 
tibt <Soi«xiwwit of l«lMfi08 ̂  vitw ti^t Hmm mmmU 
in dNwBonstrato a xul^ltstiitss of aggxtssivt {auif 
post liiii^ tiny itlMnim oan otwbat idtliittt j^ttesr 
tviiaiuit of si^qppott fxmt ot^x Ititndly nations*^^ 
Iba Aatirioan GOVTXFIMNT caUtd fm INB»zg«a6y stssion of HM Stimrity 
^n tht Cottnoil att en Jteiy 16, tht Anaviean toj^sontativo 
^ B&Wm IS^ Ti»ts. Ftbwiaty IS, 19S8, p. I, 
^ Jtolos Davids, sU., p. m* 
3S Mgg ̂  Tiats. July 16, 19S8, p. 1. 
^ For ttxt of tht Bsssagt sto Fistwir and Kxinsky, |g. cit«» 
^ ^ n n 
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in lAbaium and 
Th« p3irap9«al8 9f Pxtslitent EiMflhontsr mxm eol^ly ma»iv»ii by tht Axab 
natitms* l%«y «ec«pt«<i ^ i4ta of • Qteittd ifaitieiit-st^iirieod Davilopwtnt 
Mtttic^ity tet betti • lkiit«<i lotions p««)N» imm in th« Ili4di« last 
«i^ Uliitt<l Hations* aenil^SHrini of lamdcasts.^ 
# • # 
HM Undingi ef AMiiri^n Ktoriats in Ltbanon and tit# di«pat<^ of British 
pasatxoepoys to JofdNun mm notivatwi by Ststosm dtsizo to px«vtnt ^ two 
Aarab oounts'ios itm boing *absoarbt<i* into Pxosi/iont NasMir's Onitod Atab 
Rtpitblie* Iho Iftst l^liovod ^t to bl(Mic tiNio 0}q^n8i<»a of tl>t U.A.R* in 
thf MidiHt Sast «mld offostiiwiy tho Sovdot lAiim's x>olo in tiio 
affairs of ttio azoa»^ Hmmvmr, 9«S.«Baritish intovvontien eausad a 
blm ^ ttestofn* i>a:rticayiiariy QediUrd Statss' prostigo in tho A?ab iraafid. 
In soppiirt of thU vUim, it sooiis no^ssairy to qfnota ojctonsivsly txm tlia 
btWK^east by Homxd R. of tiie Coloidsia arosdoasting SystM on JMly 
20, imt 
•mmorn of tho ^ings that micos liMi (crisis so vneon* 
aoniy ai^iguoys is tiiat titongh MO ha^ 'to go in 1N> koop 
fxm losing piostSfO, em aet of going in is eausing us 
to loso pxostlgo. Tuo-t^ix^ of iM paro-WistcsR pajriia* 
•ont of lotMmm no wsnt in to psrotoot is said to bo 
^[i^sod to mr emdag, and pi>obably 90 posr oont of 
Jflsdanian poi^lo opp^ «s fm osning in* 
^Kiiirlining asbiguity* ei» intonist iUi tho Middio 
43 FflO- toxt of tho rasoltttiwit so# Middio £asto«i Affaiyg. Ootobos* 
19i8, p* 
^ HoonoBdst. Aagiist i6» i%8, pp. 507-8. 
45 n, *'Psa«o to tiM iUddlo iast*«»Mio8o Ptttoian 
Ml£X MJkS^. Potanisry 1, 1959, p. 76. 
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of a naw l«bMia8a pmaieteBt (Sanatai ]^*ad C^hab) aiul of tiie spaady with-
dranMl of Aaavleaii <^raapa Ijr oa^pllanea with a sraq^st of tha naw govam-
nafit« lha paaea^ sototi«» of th« esiais put tha Unitad Stataa in a battair 
poaition than aha w^l«l othandaa ha«a fownd hataalf 
Tha avanta of tN» anaulng faw wm&iB a notsbla DURNGFA IJI tha 
^aricsaQ atti^nto tmmwi Pmaidant Naasar. Tha U.A.R. «he daring 
tha patiod 1935-1958 wis fagaidad a foa of tha Wiat, a Caanmist at(^a« 
or a t^uraat to paaa«» bt&am In Asaxlean ayaa an inpoirtant faetor foar 
atabiUty in tha MMl* Eaat*"^^ Ihia Malisati^a aane aa a stsult of ifasaair's 
vicii^ attaoka m Amb CeiBMiniata alto warn baliavad to ba 9xtmmlif in^ 
fluantial in tlM naw Xxaqi xagiM*'^^ Iha Unitad States' policy to iaolata 
tha U*A*R» ftm tha taat of tha Axab w«Krld whi^ had baan adoptad in aatly 
1957 ma now i^ngad to lUuit of eoopaxatiim nitii Nassajr to block t^a ̂ vaad 
of CaoBttniatt in ̂  Mj^la Eaat«'^ 
In aairly Ma^th 1^, ̂  Iteitad Stataa gsantaid Firasidant Nassar'a 0*A«R« 
$7 Billion in mmmdM and t««^nioal aid« Tha U.S* gwmmmmt alao x*ai»ad 
to^nieal asaiataiMa Urn Taotyiical Co^zatimi Afzawaant of 1951* Of 
•Moa iapoftanoa waa t^ agxwMtaat bataaan PxaaiiNint Itesaair and Pzasidant 
B^ana Blaok of tha l^ld BaiOCj, ihieh providad for $56 adllien loan to is-
pjt&VQ tho Suea Canal* Iha U«A*R« Pxaaldant also mtoeaadad in gattin§ ti^a 
Ejqport-Xapoirt Bank and ti«a Qavalepaant ioan to axtwid imm for ttM 
H.B. Elliat SB* PP* 73-4» 
^ V9wa M. Daan» ••Paaea in tha Hlddla East-.-Whosa Job?" 
m* 
ailas Davids, jgg» cit«« p. 139. 
Kaith mMpaloak, ̂ 2* SSS** P* 
82 
6oii8tfti«TIE» #f savtf«T pxojoets IJI his 
«iri#»i^ ef 9te«fi6Uiati^ in tlie l6$t*sn«0*A.R. telaiiois ms 
^ afV9e»int of Fflmiasry 1^9 bs^m th* U.A*R« and Bzritain tahiawby 
&l9im tmaitoxr^ltias arising m% of tim 1956 mx mm 
(A tifiilix 8«ttl«wint ms xttidMid fettMHtn U*A«&« ai^ farane* ia Aagust 
NeiflMiJ, dipl«wiitie »»JUti^ imtmm imdm ami Cairo mm rasmMl 
OIL OEEIKABEX' L« 19^9*^ FOUTIWDNG TH« FV«N^U.A«B. XTF}«3»TI«A •FVHHWKIT* 
^ e^^intarits «i@B«ci « trade afi««Mmt m Pa^Hiybair 23, I9&9«^ In lata 
196],, iMdwtirvs, a ̂ ozt-tem attain in tlMi FtanecNO.A.il* telati<»i8 wit m» 
stiltad txm ̂  0.A.E**s aecusatli^i df nim Ftaneten af ea»itietifii 
aspi^fa aetivitiaa in Sg^t ai^ ef trying to aasatalna'^ Prasiitent lias-
aar* Die §wmp uliieh wis tei^daad of lour ati^rs af tlia effieial Ftaneh 
C^BBdasiw m French Xntajrests in tha il*A.R*« tm iaw^r8> 9td Hm Jaomal* 
ists mm te ba braay^jht to trial in Cair«*^ Hia U«A*R« attth^itiaa amaun* 
cad tiui raleasa of Hm nina franelbfian bafera lyia trial was e««idttatad# 
Dieir relsasa sranifaatad a dasire on tlia part al ̂  |}*A«R. for eaaplata 
franco^.A^R. za}^r9a<(^eiBtantt af^r fmmt mmqaim^  riffht of salf-
^^»liiatim for Algeria, On ̂ ril 17, 1962 tiia tfiaitad Arab Rapuiblie 
ann^Bieed its plan to have 'Hinited Arab Airlines'* start a new liiw be<-> 
tMien Cairo and Paris «^en dl|>losHiti« relations jtotmeen tlie tNo aoHntrias 
B«$imiss Wseka Howmber 28, 1999» 107*8} see also Jules t^vids, 
"Ihe Unit^ States and tiie Middle lastt 1953-1960,** Middle iaatern Alfaira, 
May 1961, p. 139| si^ H*B» Ellis, {^« «it«, pp. 194'-6« 
m aal imml* %Hng l?59, p. m. 
^ SddM aifslstt Oetober 1958, p. 332. 
^ Jiiles Davids, *nrhe Iftiited States and the Middle Basts 1955-1960,•• 
JE* f|it*m p» 139. 
Vera M* Dean, "Peace in the Middle Eaat«»«ilhQse J^^i" gg. eit. 
Middle iastem Affairs, Jaimary 1962, p. 32» 
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mm mtmmdrn^'^ 
fht 9t Inlttd MJUtiens, Ijngta in 
fairly 1959, ai^ ptttiyie«d Hit naw AMsriean attifa^ immvi Kaasav# ia 
6«Atimi^ ̂lytwgli #airly 1962* iaexgt MaMrttot, Aiswsial»«l Pxtat 
li^dNil* iatteim anal^t f«pi»rt«d to Apxil, 1!NI2, ^8i(hitit Nassa? is 
aaftfti«ti»@ im ini^asai acivMa^e aid iwm Stttit* tlta 
addad, "A stmm of t^lli^t visi'^art ftm Nashiagton Ims latladtd ̂  
»}vingi «»inair ^ ws^sU (Ii«r9t S« Itediiwttt}, 
and an Btmrnijn mMmt, ^hmyd HbBm* All mm ^it^ly a«lMi?ad intd 
Ni8s#jr*a dlflea.^ visiter hava indieatad 19.§* willliiiatas ̂  
a«ie^ past 4iiUtmmf6 nA^ Px^sidaRt lliamt* HM &«A.R, a«theiritita 
ianadiataly twsp^Rdad bf t«iidiA9 EemmAm Miniitajr Abdal IknaiUi •l'4Cai8swii 
aad a dtolagatic^ ef aj^xts t9 Wtshii^tfin tst emttt idLth ^bifeamatimial 
Mcoiatajry fmi and Amiiean aid olfieiaU*^^ 
Ap*il 18, 1962, p. 3. 
Mi» Apfil 13, 1962, p. 9. 




ttiay #1 iSios* 1## mm 
e«nniiiiini haw ICH^ botn 
1^ i&m «ii4 fGZfottiiit «nd If 
tiwy as* fwwii^xt^ isem Um to tini« 
it i« «• liho hmi^ht 
sislot'toM to ttioir poi^lot* this is 
ifey I m eomfimvd tiwt lit* ttiisi? 
mill, fiin no laufoXi hf playinii Ultm 
imgatoiy »oU of « lifh^iir ifiiinst 
eoflmmisB* oiwn if it my i4n hfyst 
fm tim boingii goo4 piMs of 
iNirtsia in ttm i^t^tialist 
oimttios* 
Nikita S. Khjmthehoir^ 
Hui A»ib poii^lo mfe ij^smssodl by ̂  Seviot staiMl dsurinf tiui S^jc 
oirisis. Thoy bolifv«i l^t tt» l^ssi«» ultimte to Brittin* Wsiim, «ai 
Ismml to halt thoix* i^jrosei^ii against igypt playad a m^os' srolo 1^ tkm 
ttne«»iditiMal ndthdvawil ol An33Lo-FttAcH->l8i»Mili fo»Gos ttm %yptian 
tsfi^itoty* Nistotii oli»ofv»«a* of^^tiim that Hm Sawiot namiBd ̂ tiivoiro^ 
to Urn tluma ̂ wading (sonntriae was mant iMily to firi^htoii thm* and #Mt 
tha &9vi«^ Minftjr li^i^d to ̂ aash a mieltay to <ial«iid Igypt^a sova* 
aot tmxk ia|»»sa Wm Ai»b miM* Iho kjmh paapla mm 
eommmd only with ̂  ftissian stt^ attack afainst IHMdaars aiNl mm 
SmUt ajq^xaasad williiigmsa t& i)a»tieipata in tha ̂ foiisa ol Bgt^t* i:ht 
S0iiriat taeties in faia^ p^iatity In Bgi^t and tha fast of tha Axab wsrld 
iiasa sttoaassihil*^ Iha Sovlat (Tnion bagan to ai^ar as tim i«Mioybtod dafandav 
^ Uipartmnt of Stata, Sgyiat Wofid Oiitiook. pablieatiwi 
(Ibshingtafiy ^ly l?©9), p* ais# 
 ̂ fet saa W«W« {Qaiski, s&* SSS*» P* 
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te tossia (and efhty Sovlat ea l̂litas). & ad4ltii»R» Motesir axitealtd 
exadits at l€M» intaJTtst f̂ ata pat t̂) ta E t̂»  ̂ tha Savlat alfialall 
saxvay af Seviat aaslitaaea te tNi l̂ dla Saat (aa xaptcNteaad l>y Hl&lla 
Mutrnm Affairs« l.9^» pp» WMt) giwa an aeeaMiit al ̂  {jtoh* 
jaata t̂ t Mta ta Iw eaaatmatad a S«iriat«>%)î tljift aU 
agaNMBanti 
•••IR Unitad AiNik l^^Ua» Savlat tixm ham baaa 
aaaistiiii tR s t̂esî l̂  and anlafiflag l@@ psrojaetat 
Inatodifig alx antaipiiaas in Ummm aî  mth" 
fmet&m aatal six «iî ifia»l9ttildiRt plant* • 
tiiaiva antayptiaaa in tha ail atid dbrndml instaatty 
(MBSNm ^MHs ana a^-ptodiaini plant* tm pimmm* 
«a«itleai antaxpyiaaa and ana plant fc»r nl̂ ia lax  ̂
tiiiiata)* Hiay ata aiaa aaaisting to tha e«»straction 
al a îpyaxd, î ixw pianta, a taiiMad» 
at aiMi iinr̂ atitti sî %n» and axa aisa 
eatyylnsi aat gaalagiaal paro^paating* astaMiahinf a 
mialaax physies iab«aratî » and installing an at«d.e 
2aaati»r» 
# • « 
l̂ aiitent lliasa:r*6 Strang «î ositiai) ta ^a iiaanhaiiay IJaetriiM-* 
tmf it aimflia^d ndltli his dtiva fat Atab ^aiatahip and Ax«h nanttality in 
tha eold imt̂ aaineî d adt̂  lfaaei»r*s ^Jaatims to ptavant  ̂ataatî a af 
a Wis'tosn-inapiMd alliaiu»i in ^a Miiî la Eaat* tha daatriUMi «na dbnaumwd 
hy ^a Sanriats as a plan af t̂ad Stataa iapatialistia daHinatian of ika 
Wlddla iaatatn aaun îas#^® On ^amiaty 12# l̂ 7»  ̂U.s.s.R» isaoad a 
atatmant wttning that tba docladina eiKtld laad to mv in tite ataat f(Mr 
SM«s also l̂aa <*lha tMltiNl Statas and tha M^ddla 
Eastt 11^1960.,» eit«. p« ISSf and IhoMs %• Pinlattat. gataian 
Palieyt tha Maxt Mia»i tlaw Ymk* Haa t̂ aî  6tatiiats» I9^h P* 
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"i 
i m s n 
a Ctartainly airl;* ate do not wtot to tuom hlA into i Cmmmi&t 
•f!^ Iw not milt to tozn us into nationalistft." 
mfwm Md#) %inpt*s oo^A^e aiii |>olitloal ai^iticNst mntH 
xeeo^niaai liiy F>so8iiant ̂ tsot miito# to koop Ma sapxtssiosi of total 
CoMK^iaf^ stpaYati distl^ust ftm hia frios^ly sotati^a nAtl) Sew* 
iot Vltdm* Aftejr #ui Bgiyptiaii t3m49 solatiena vrith tiio CooMe-
aiat bloe hoo«aa mwf 9tmm» %ll>t had lost wrat of Itot tfaditisml Mtst* 
01^ anyluits im BgfptUn oottoii* aio was ̂ ilytng new CmmmUt 
i» Imy Wm eMi^, iliii^ fyemisho^ hot 6@ posr oont of Bs^t's 
•x^ngt li^owi*^^ fNtt1^f8M»xo, Nassov ha(i to iipomi on tho SovloiNt imt 
annnints. ttm Soirlot llni«i in 1^7, 4tlimx94 to Egypt tloroo sub-
mHm9$ th& first suhBavines to ho ao^itod by any Mttddlo iastoim powot*^^ 
In gonopalf Bflpt was hasioaily eoasittod to toeoivtng tim §mUt$ mlUUfy 
aid*^^ Most iKpmetmt of aU Khimshi^v's aimoyneaaMnit en Oo^Amt? 33» 
that his fovaznaont ha4 agiooii to ptovitii Bsin^t wiH) 400 siUion xoblos 
(littlo $100 iiiliien dolla^e ) to oanHlits Immxd tiia eonstmiotiim of tiui 
wi^ 498im4 i$igh Ammtt Dm*^^ tl^w mis tgammnt, tho toon wetttd ho to-
paid in twoivo aamaai instalXnontst hoaa^ a S| pot eont mm$l intotost* 
tiw fitst instaltwint to ho paid in 1964* Tht mm»f so paid vnitld ho spont 
m piit^uising oooBoditios ftoK tho lAsitod Atah iopyibiie* tho Soviet fovotn-
iMnt «^ld atso ptovldo iNictoioai assistanoo ̂  tlM ooaplotien of tho fitst 
8ta§« of ̂  dm m an sftood dato*^^ 
15 H.B, litis, 2B» p, 17. 
^1^,1 £eb M ili-« p* 
H»B* lilia, sit** p* 1^9. 
Koi^i lQiooloek» fg. Cit«» p, 204, 
Fot toxt of tho agtowMntf soo Middto Bastotn Affairs* 
Fohtitaty 1939* p* 78* 
Ane^t f«sr iillllngiMr«s te pirawott friondly x«Utii«i8 
idL')^  SevlAts iMi« ilito86^*s Mfttiiness to Pjrt8i<lint Hassftt tt 
^ Ittdtv tf I2it Amb wKrl(i»^ the Smritts suppeirttd Httstr's polleits tfii 
•nnifttttd tiitir antdinttt t« «otptx«tt witli his ht«)^ df Amb nttlontiisB.^ 
Bills* Warn n.A.R* ittidtr btlitinid Hmt his smmtry's In^ytst ;rt«piftd 
ht mt bt ta etttspe^n against Inttxnationai CemttinisR* As 
Hasstiya fityiul» Prtsident Htesstr's ̂ st^ ai(te and edit^ of ikX'Mam 
ntwspaptjr* saiii in Caito in ttrly Jaana:ry i957» "Egypt's aliianot ndth the 
Soviets Mas* tvm the Egyptian point of view* a ̂ ftnsive Idling. Bgypt had 
little diioite but to t&m to Ifa^seowy since (^ly the Soviets mm idlling to 
fianish the 0«A*R* felt it needed.*^ 
• * * 
The events foll^iRlng ̂  Ixaqi ftevelutim of JUly 19i8t tooufht 
strikilii devel4^F^nt8 in Itesser's xtlatioi» with the SovUt Union* Zanqi 
PxwBier Ab^l Katlai KassMif instead of bfiaging Imq into a ttaion «i^ the 
ttelted A«»b Repttblie as Rasser had OKpeeted* folltwid an indepeiiMjent poliey* 
Katsen de»laje»d In Dtoetdbex 19S8» fhat h9 would pjnisejrve Zxtq's "lactependenee 
and s«iwe]Nil9nty> at the sow tUw doing evesrytihing possible f&x ^e beiM-
fit of tilt A»ib pe^le***^ The e«iise<|iienoe of Kasswi's sove to psraserte 
Iraq's indepeiMieiM^i was a split between PttKiex Kasseo^s followsirs and 
W.W, Kttlski# SB* SJIM P- 568# 
Ibid., p. m* 
^ As (poted in H,B, Ellis, SlS«» VP* H'-B* 
23 As quoted in Jeaehia Joesten, eit». pp 212-13* 
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tlw l(n»st peiat 
Kasi^ir ttvult m Mati^ 3, 1959* In 3b»iq asainst tiw eantx«l 9«ni«;m-
«an% of PsrwBiar Kas«mn»^ n^isti^ was extighac! by tita Ixaqi aijr ttmm 
ai»i Um pt&^mamA9t Ixaqi nilitla. Pi>«sl<iant Haaaat x«aeta4 damwyielni 
Atafe CoMHBiista at agants 9I **a fotalgn p««fet*"^ Biis ma liegiRnIng 
$1 a Mir »l wMNia Ma^waa and Cait@. ^ Ma^ 16, 1^, alta:r sign­
ing a $i!irlat-Isa(|l aaa^NMle aid afsramant, mdair nM.^ tha l}«S«$*R. plad@aii 
idlllQA zttltlaa at tadmieal aqnj^Mwnt ai»d iM^svlsaa, Khtush^MW at 
a Ki«Hdlin taai^tl^ tm tha £r»qi ̂ itela^atiaci ae^sad FiN»aiite«it Masaat al 
**adiiptiii3 1^ lanpuiffa df tha inpaj^ialleta" in mmimmim fmh Cawwuilite* 
iite aaid Pfaaliant Haaaar baing "a vathar yci»ng wan ai^i mVtmx hat* 
Nia^, tGi^ «pso hlKaall mm tiian his statKjra pa]»dtt»4»**^ Osallangins 
Fiwsidant liasat'a tlala aa «f all Amh fMic^laa mith^t i^aird 
t« tha. InlUiyaat of Hia aaiMifata Asmh atoitas# Swiat fmAm ad^i 
It is aaidi that Amb nationallm allagadly staada 
ab«wa tha in^raats of saparata Axab stataa, aitMnra tlw 
mtavaata #f diffavant «ietiafna @1 thi p^latiw In Um 
Amh aauntriaa* UMIII* la no doubt t^at the »i|airity of 
AtaM hava &mmm intitaaite In iiw ats^la against 
colonial slavairy. Btit aftair e^try ha» tid itsalf 
of f^igin daadnatiimt tha JU^tataata of 1^ pa^la oannot 
ha ifmnrad* £adlaad tha Intairaate of all Axaba oawiot 
ooinoiia* tha al^wopta to ifnova, ondar oomis 
of natl«»lieB» Inta^at of aa{»i»ita saoti^ia of tha 
p<¥»ttiati^. Sntaioat of tha noxkii^ pafi¥>la» am 
tintanabla 
^ M* lis il^ Sapffigt. Mafoh 30, 1959, pp. 37-9. 
29 Kaith ihaalook, p. ̂ 4. 
mn MM mm* m-* p- 217. 
SiRfiot Wogld Outlook, ag. sH., p. 217. 
intemstieail CemualsB. dtUviMd m Max̂  30» 19S9» h# saids 
M» tried net to mfc* the leeal eetlvltles of Arab 
CeuKmlste la Xr«q or Syrle a teaewi fer any elaeh with 
I^esla as as ̂ ssla did net Interfere In our affairs* 
Ne were tri^Uig te eenvlnee ««a>selinis tilMt CeMBunist 
Parlies in eitr «euntries ware independent of intesniatienal 
Cfiiwi»ii«iR« Mi feu^ tliat titey ware net» ai^ ̂ at was «iiy 
I called th«K CesHiunist stoofes. They carried ̂ t orders 
and instractiens tc ll^piiMite patriotic and national 
elemnts in order to place our cotintry inside the sones of 
CcMHenist infl^Mince* Ha mm suddenly faced by flagrant 
interference in our internal affairs by Sussia* There was 
e^oamte evi^nce of an alliaiMM beiNien Wm iosslan 
ai^ CcMBonists working against us inside our country.^^ 
Frc» these 1^ speeches it could be conelu<ted that Soviet-Arab re* 
lati<ms haira entered a new p^ase* The leaders of the Kreslin se«Md to 
have given up the idea of dealii^ with President Kasser as the leader of 
the Arab world* The new i^se wes diaraeterized by a Soviet desire to 
establish close and friendly relstltms with the individual Arab states* even 
^ou^h meh relations night eeum a rmrse effect to $0viet»Q.A«R* friend* 
^hi^. H^verir Soviets have gone ahead with tl^ir plans and conaittMnts 
for ecfmomic and tectoical assistance to Urn fftiited Arab Republic* This 
was d«»ie (tespite the enti-CoBwtmist line maintained by President !iasser*$ 
govemaent* 
Xn April 1^9 PriMaier Khxuehchev took the initiative In bringing 
about a reconciliation in Soviet*a*A*R* relaticms* He wrote Ifasser a per* 
sonal letter In viiich he esqpresmd his desire for a closer and more cordial 
relationship wii^ the U*A.R*^^ In late May* l%9« Al-Ahraa. ooHnenting on 
Prmier Khrushchev's statMwnt to an Indian Joumallst that the pe^le of 
U1.A*R* had no sincere and true friend ̂ an the Soviet Iftiiont wrot»i 
32 As quoted in Keith i^elock* fit*. p* 275 
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Soviet «fid ae«^s«d t^MMi el sMiiiiig favoar ndtii titt ffttittd 
ftraydt eoneltt^ by dtelav^ tliat tb« Sevlat ltol<!«i Sevitt*A»ib 
fviifid8hl|} iixl slaraivt te stMng^n 
KsMivwr, NIIU« imlm eanitietad ^israv^h ease »^ia by hvVti 
siitst tha tfisptita did not saan t@ hava eansad any viaibla attain m 
S0«riat-tf»A«!l. yalatiaes* 
Oi J^nyiary !,&» I96&g to ̂aa^irfc Soviet dasixa to asaiJita^ fyiandiy 
xaiatieNoa tidtN ̂  0«AttR.t Pimniav Khxttsh^iaiF in a pass^X Mstasa to 
Pzasi^nt Niaiajr anp^assad hit emfi^dkinaa that ̂ a High Aswan Qui usttld 
ba e«p}<«^ m a^MNhia* Utii Maaaga* irtiicii ms datimiji^d by Soviat 
Ministat of Eiao^ie Pmmw S^tions Igiiati I* Mivikav, assttvad tha ll*A*t« 
Fa^sidant of eoBtii^ad Sotdat aqai|»Mint ai^ ta^ieai assistanea fm tNi 
40 
6e«piat» e(!»$txttOti<»i of tlw 
Ibid.> Jtana 18, 1961, p. U. 
i7t i%2. p. n* 
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liMiuix* has this paiiey mniiastad itsalf soxa viviiiiy tha» in tha 
Miidla last* Haxa» tha Mast has alwi<^ pTacaadbd on tha assu^ti^ ̂ t 
if it axair^d anengh poiitieal.» aocmonio* and aiiitazy pmsmtt, aiKi if it 
offasrad tar^in ifMiu<«»ints**«ieh as financial aid—it ̂ ml4 »aka Ayab 
govazimants sign traatias m antai? allianaas iragairdlass of the eonaacipanoae 
to tha national intozests of ̂ a Asab paella* 
lha Wast has failad to sae that ̂  A^bs—lika otlia? peopla'»-az» 
natu^lly inoXinad to placa thair em aspirations and intarasts abeva tha 
aspisaticKTis intozasto of aithax paarty to tiia East»1ii8t e<»ifliet« Indaady 
part el tiia sisum^tstai^ing batwatan tha A»b paapla ami tita pOMats 
Atting the last daea^ night be attrifaatod to tha WKsteim inclinati^ of 
viewing Arab nati^liim prJ^riiy ttm tha angle of tiie oold war and of 
exiMeting Arab 8ttb<»rdinati^ to Nastam positiim m eeld war issiMS* 
On ̂  e^r hand» tlia Soviet {liii«o» mhile being idbielogieally at ochis 
Willi Arab nationaii«R» has attenptod to shM» Itot its ralati^ witli tha 
Arab p»9pl» ware not dictated by Russian interest in Hie cold war* 
The Soviets have proved by ̂ ads their readiness to offer eoonoaiic and 
•iiitory aid to any Arab e<xtntry without dktaandij^ a Hiatus amd withoat 
f^ing it into subordiiMtion. Moreover, by their reeogniti«A of* and 
assistance to« Arab naticMnalisat t^te Soviets won t}» friendship of Asmb 
pe^le. Sovieto have also profitod fron '^eir encouraging of the neu­
tralist ton^ncy in ̂ e Arab countries» sinee sui^ a tondency would con­
ceivably diainish the l«8stom influence in these countries. 
# • # 
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eiNTiMznins eolonlalim it sh«ild suppoirt th« prineiplo of s«lf*dNit»iniiiati^ 
th« iMidilf Eastf Qliil^d Statos enjoys ono na^zal advan^ge* i*»*» 
it has novax had any colonial activitios in the aMa. ̂  BNist show the 
Ajrab pei^le h«t unterstanding and xespect of theiir naticmalistie aspirations 
and of ̂ it nofi-alignMnt policy* 
Arab nati^lim is fair noxe incoa|>atible witii CoowRtisn Hum with 
Mtstetn interests. As a nattet of fact. President Masser is e^i¥ineed l^t 
local C^BNKiiiist parties snorted by ttf Soviet bloc are potentially the 
fteatest ̂ xeat to Arab unity wider his leadervhl^. XdeologiiMlly, Arab 
natifiialisa an^ CosaunisK sees not likely to exist sidb by side. It is 
believed t^t Nasser would i«^er accept ftestem cooperatiem than ̂ issian 
aid* iteshington oust realize l^is fact and should adi^t a policy based m 
coqperati<M» and uncfairstai^ini. this policy shwild h« based en reeogai* 
tion of a fact that if Mist desires to keep l&e Middle last ̂ t of Cm^ 
ffiunist influence» it cannot affojNI to lose the friendship and sya^a'^y ef 
the leader of an ijq>ortant ccKint^ SJEJ the area, "^le United Arab iepublic* 
It seeas that a mw Aoerican ai^roach toward President Hasser and 
th* Arab naticmalisa Aoveeent viliich he chaapitNAs shcftild pay ̂  retards to 
the following cbjectives* (I) Hie eliainatiim of Vtm rennants of Anglo-
French col^ial possessicms in the Middle East* The existence of t^se 
poseessi^t such as» for example* Aden, and Bahnin, is a renin^r to 
Arab pe^le of the past eolwriial activities of these tm pcwersf (2) iNe 
support of Arab nationalisK and Arab unity| (3) the adoption of nore i«* 
partial approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict* and 'Uie sear^ for a solu-
tiim according to United Nations decisi^si {President Ntaseer has declared 
several tines that if Israel accepts all the United Katicms resolutiems* he 
101 
«f»M» to fivop his hostility towtsd th«t stote.)^ (4) Urn ox'teasion 
of aid to tNi ht%h oMBitrios to mstj mi^i modod oeonenio and a^ial 
dovoloixMiett ai!^ (S) ̂  ̂11 aoooptaneo of tlui Anb dtoiaro to jpcnrao its 
{»olioy of n««i-Milifiintiit in Urn fast-Wtst o^nfliet. 
A h«polttl lo^ at 9mm wmt »iooat Misteii» aofos %&mw4 P»o«id«nt 
l^seo# my siig^ost ̂ t a iww {^so in lUstosni-Ax^b solatia Miy bo in tht 
offing* 
^ Hho wmt inp«»rtant tl.19* xosoltttiaa c<m^s»iiii tN» oottloMiit of tho 
AMb*X$»aoli eonfliot me that 1947«<>1948 oalling m Xsraol to zolin^ii^ 
aboat iawnty por oont of hor prosont tonriteary to Palostinian Axobs and 
also to adnit '^oso Atab fofu^oos nHling to 90 baok to tiMijr old zosidoAeoe 
new wdoy Itvaoli sovoioignty* Sto» Itothoy Eliot» "^(Mld tfa* U»S. Soli 
A3ea» to israol.** fwroian Policy aallotin. Janua^ 15, 1^, p. 3. 
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